Behavioral and cognitive correlates of intolerance of uncertainty in children with and without anxiety disorders. by Gramszlo, Colette Marie
University of Louisville
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
8-2019
Behavioral and cognitive correlates of intolerance of
uncertainty in children with and without anxiety
disorders.
Colette Marie Gramszlo
University of Louisville
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact
thinkir@louisville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gramszlo, Colette Marie, "Behavioral and cognitive correlates of intolerance of uncertainty in children with and without anxiety
disorders." (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3279.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/3279
BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF INTOLERANCE OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT ANXIETY DISORDERS 
By 
Colette Marie Gramszlo 
B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 2013 
M.S., University of Louisville, 2016 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in Clinical Psychology 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, Kentucky 
August, 2019 

ii 
BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF INTOLERANCE OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT ANXIETY DISORDERS 
By 
Colette Marie Gramszlo 
B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 2013 
M.S., University of Louisville, 2016 
A Dissertation Approved on 
June 25, 2018 
by the following Dissertation Committee: 
Dissertation Director  
Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D. 
Cara Cashon, Ph.D. 
Judith Danovitch, Ph.D. 
Cheri Levinson, Ph.D. 
Christine Brady, Ph.D. 
iii 
DEDICATION 
To Eric, Roxie, and Melanie, whose love has been a steadying force and a constant 
source of motivation.  
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thank you to my mentor, Dr. Janet Woodruff-Borden, for her endless 
encouragement and guidance throughout my time as a graduate student. Her creativity 
and leadership have been a model for my professional development and I am grateful for 
the time and energy she has invested in my academic future. Thank you to Dr. Cara 
Cashon, for her invaluable input on collection and analysis of this project’s data; to Dr. 
Cheri Levinson, for her thoughtful feedback on this and previous projects; to Dr. Judith 
Danovitch, for her insight on theoretical aspects of this work; and to Dr. Christine Brady, 
for her generous support and advice, clinically and academically. Finally, thank you to 
Judy Mier-Chairez and Angela Lee for their gracious assistance with this project and for 
their humor and friendship.   
v 
ABSTRACT 
BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF INTOLERANCE OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT ANXIETY DISORDERS 
Colette Marie Gramszlo 
June 25th, 2018 
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) has long been identified as a proximal risk factor 
for the development of anxiety disorders, and more recently has been implicated in the 
development of emotional disorders broadly. However, little is known about how IU and 
psychopathology symptoms relate, limiting the degree to which IU can be identified prior 
to the development of emotional disorders and targeted during the intervention of 
disorder symptoms. The current study reviews several areas of literature to inform a 
model by which IU impacts anxiety symptoms. First, uncertainty processing and the 
development of uncertainty processing in childhood are reviewed. Next, IU is reviewed 
and model of the impact of IU on uncertainty processing is proposed. Finally, childhood 
IU is reviewed and current gaps in the childhood IU literature are identified. The current 
study hypothesized that IU contributes to uncertainty avoidance, which is reflected by 
cognitive and behavioral processes associated with decision-making under uncertainty. 
Specifically, this study tested the hypothesis that children with higher IU demonstrate 
less efficient information processing and decision-making, particularly in the presence of 
ambiguous information. Further, this study tested the hypotheses that the relation 
between IU and disorder symptoms would be moderate by individual differences in 
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higher order cognitive control processes implicated in decision-making. The study 
recruited 47 children, 23 with anxiety disorders and 24 without, to test these hypotheses. 
Children completed a decision-making computer task and children and their parents 
completed questionnaires. Overall, the results partially supported the study hypotheses. 
IU predicted greater reaction time (RT) during the task but RT was not greater in the 
presence of ambiguous, as compared to neutral or threatening, stimuli for children with 
high IU. IU predicted greater distraction from the task target and distraction was 
increased in the presence of ambiguous stimuli for children with high IU. Accuracy was 
not related to IU. Exploratory analyses indicated that children with high IU demonstrated 
greater RT variability compared to children with low IU, and greater distractibility in 
earlier, compared to later, task trials. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical and 
clinical implications for future study and intervention of IU.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainties, large and small, are a constant presence in daily life, and the 
resolution of uncertainty is a fundamental task of the human brain. We are driven to 
reduce uncertainty as it arises through cognitive and emotional processes that facilitate 
decision-making behaviors, whether determining what to eat for dinner or which career to 
pursue. For some, however, uncertainty presents a unique challenge. Intolerance of 
Uncertainty (IU) is defined as the inability to endure the unpleasant responses triggered 
by the perceived absence of sufficient information (Carleton, 2016). IU is dispositional, 
and individuals with high IU experience aversive reactions to uncertainty across contexts. 
Elevated levels of IU have been identified across a wide variety of psychiatric disorders, 
including anxiety, post-traumatic stress, obsessive/compulsive, eating and mood 
disorders.  
While IU appears to precede the onset of psychopathology symptoms, it is unclear 
why this relation exists. Current research in this area has relied primarily on 
questionnaires measuring beliefs and opinions regarding uncertainty, limiting our 
knowledge of the neurobiological and behavioral characteristics of those with high IU. 
The introduction of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) has highlighted the need to 
integrate research concerning core domains of neurobehavioral function, such as affect 
and cognition, with clinical research to clarify the fundamental mechanisms of 
psychopathology (Sanislow et al., 2010) and allow basic science research to directly 
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inform the study and treatment of psychopathology (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). However, 
no models have linked IU to psychopathology with regard to these core domains.  
Examining IU among youth, who are still developing the ability to process 
uncertainty, may inform models of IU as a predictor of psychopathology. In childhood, 
uncertainty presents an opportunity to learn new information, challenge existing beliefs 
about the world, and practice problem-solving skills. For individuals with high IU, 
uncertainty is unacceptable, distressing, paralyzing and ultimately avoided. Children with 
high IU likely limit their exposure to uncertainty, hindering their uncertainty processing 
development. Avoidance of uncertainty at a young age may contribute to maladaptive 
uncertainty processing strategies, which ultimately allows psychopathology symptoms to 
emerge. Newly created, age appropriate measurement tools (e.g., Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale for Children) have allowed IU to be identified in children as young as 
seven (Comer et al., 2009), but there remains a paucity of research concerning IU in 
childhood and the characteristics of children with high IU in uncertain environments.  
Given the increasing interest in IU as a transdiagnostic construct with clinical 
utility (Shihata, McEvoy, Mullan, & Carleton, 2016), a clearer picture of the behavioral 
and cognitive correlates of IU during the development of uncertainty processing (i.e., in 
childhood) is necessary at this time to understand how IU relates to the emergence of 
psychopathology. Uncertainty processing and the development of this processing will 
first be reviewed as a background on relevant methods and systems. IU literature will be 
reviewed and a model of the maintenance of IU will be proposed. Childhood IU literature 
will then be reviewed, along with an overview of the limits and future directions of this 
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work. The current study aimed to begin addressing these limitations by investigating 
uncertainty processing among youth with and without anxiety disorders.   
Uncertainty Processing 
Uncertainty refers to the realization that there is insufficient information in the 
present environment to make predictions about the future (Yu & Dayan, 2005), and the 
brain relies on external and internal information to resolve uncertainty as it arises. 
External information includes environmental cues—the facial expression of a stranger or 
the perceived speed of a car coming toward you. Internally, emotional arousal, emotional 
valence, and related bodily sensation provide informational cues. This bottom-up 
information interacts with top-down predictions about the future to determine whether 
sufficient certainty exists. When top-down predictions (e.g., hearing a fire alarm and 
predicting that the building is on fire) are violated by bottom-up information (e.g., no 
smoke or heat are present), uncertainty arises (Yu & Dayan, 2003).  
Several related terms are used across uncertainty and IU literature: expected 
uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, probability and value. Uncertainty is 
said to be expected when a cue relating to an outcome is unreliable. For instance, when a 
car’s left-hand turn signal flashes, there is a good chance that the driver will soon make a 
left turn. However, the driver may have signaled too soon, and there exists some expected 
uncertainty regarding when the driver will turn left. The degree of expected uncertainty, 
sometimes termed risk, may fluctuate depending on certain conditions, such as the 
geographic location or the speed of the driver. If, however, the driver turns right, 
unexpected uncertainty, or ambiguity, exists (Bland & Schaefer, 2012). In the case of 
unexpected uncertainty, the cue itself has changed and a belief has been violated (Cohen 
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& Aston-Jones, 2005). Expected and unexpected uncertainty activate separable neural 
substrates, with expected uncertainty activating regions associated with error detection 
and unexpected uncertainty activating regions associated with novelty detection, 
providing evidence that humans process these two types of uncertainty in distinct ways 
(Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013).   
Uncertainty is resolved through decision-making, and decisions represent 
responses to uncertainty. Decision-making is defined as the selection of a response, 
following a cue, based on both the predicted value and the computed probability of the 
outcome associated with that response (FeldmanHall, Glimcher, Baker, & Phelps, 2016). 
Uncertainty, as described above, arises when the response paired with a stimulus is an 
unreliable or volatile predictor of an outcome.  Decision-making is a temporal process, 
and the selection of a response to uncertainty is based on knowledge of past responses 
and previously learned causal statistics within the environment (Huettel, Song, & 
McCarthy, 2005). If a child is cued by their teacher to note an upcoming exam, that child 
may decide whether or not to study based on how much studying was required to do well 
on past exams. Decision-making requires future based processing as well. Selecting 
“study” as a response to “upcoming test” also depends on how risky it will be to do 
poorly on this specific upcoming exam, and how rewarding it will be to do well.  
Decision science has traditionally studied responses to uncertainty by examining 
which options are selected, how accurately decisions are made, and how quickly those 
decisions are made (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007). New models of 
decision-making reflect a recent paradigm shift within the field toward the cognitive 
processes underlying decision-making, including “basic perceptual, attentional, memory 
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and aggregation processes” (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015, p. 277) in addition to 
observable behavior under uncertainty. Emotion and cognitive control are two key 
processes elicited by uncertainty and involved in the resolution of uncertainty through 
decision-making.  
Emotion and uncertainty. Uncertainty and emotions intersect at multiple points 
during decision-making, both arising from and contributing to decisions, and affecting 
thoughts and behaviors associated with decision-making (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & 
Kassam, 2015). Of note, the terms affect and emotion are used somewhat interchangeably 
throughout this proposal to reflect the linguistic choices of different authors. Though the 
two do differ somewhat, with affect referring more to psycho-physiological experiences 
and emotions being social constructions of those experiences, they are largely 
synonymous (Russell, 2003). Uncertainty in decision-making interacts with both 
emotional arousal and emotional valence. Arousal refers to the amount of experienced 
affect, while valence refers to the kind of affective state (Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, 
& Trujillo, 2007). Emotions can also be integral to decision-making, arising directly from 
a situation, or incidental to decision-making, arising from one situation and affecting 
decisions made about another.  
Uncertainty increases emotional arousal and increases in specific emotions 
reciprocally increase the perception of uncertainty. In a series of four studies examining 
the interaction of emotion and uncertainty, Bar-Anan, Wilson and Gilbert (2009) showed 
participants film clips aimed at eliciting positive or negative affect. Participants in the 
uncertainty condition were prompted to state phrases such as “I’m not sure what’s 
happening” while viewing the clips, while those in the certainty condition stated phrases 
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such as “I understand” and “I see what’s happening.” Participants in the uncertainty 
condition reported more extreme affect related to the clips, despite having received the 
same objective amount of information. This suggests that despite the true availability of 
information in an environment, the perception of uncertainty elicits increased affect. The 
authors hypothesize that perceived uncertainty may elicit affect to make goal-relevant 
cues in the environment more salient, so that they can be attended to and used as 
additional information to resolve uncertainty (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009). 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) explored the interaction of uncertainty, emotion and 
information processing in a series of experiments. In the first experiment, undergraduates 
were induced to feel positive or negative emotions using an emotional memories task, 
then asked to make predictions about the future and rate their subjective certainty about 
these predictions. They found differences in the effect of emotional valence on decisions 
by demonstrating that participants who were primed to feel positive emotions (i.e., 
happy) were more certain about their predictions, while participants primed to feel 
negative emotions (i.e., anxious) were less certain. In a second experiment, they found 
that emotional valence also affected depth of thought under uncertainty, by showing that 
participants induced to feel happy, and thus more certain about their decisions, were more 
likely to rely on less effortful cognitive processing during decision-making, while 
participants induced to feel anxious, and thus less certain, were more likely to rely on 
effortful and controlled cognitive processing (Larissa Z. Tiedens, 2001). 
Importantly, the mood induction portion of each experiment was incidental to the 
second portion of the experiment involving information processing and decision-making. 
An individual does not need to feel uncertainty about the decision itself to experience 
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uncertainty while making a decision, and it is hypothesized that individuals who 
experience more negative affect in general are also more likely to perceive uncertainty 
across environments and experiences. Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) experiments also 
demonstrate that anxiety, a specific negative mood state, facilitates controlled processing 
of information during decision-making. Anxiety elicits the perception of uncertainty, 
which then triggers a methodical analysis of all available information to create certainty 
about a decision (Larissa Z. Tiedens, 2001). 
Cognitive control and uncertainty. Cognitive control refers to higher order, top-
down processes responsible for goal-directed activity. Humans typically conserve 
cognitive resources by operating through automatic processing unless triggered to switch 
toward controlled processing (Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 2011). Triggers that initiate 
controlled cognitive processing include the detection of errors (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2012; Yeung & Cohen, 2006), conflict between competing responses (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), and changes in the prediction of error likelihood (Brown 
& Braver, 2005). Broadly, cognitive control takes over when existing models of the 
environment do not match incoming information, indicating that there is a mismatch 
between available representations of the environment and the actual environment, leading 
automatic processing to yield undesirable outcomes (e.g., errors). This mismatch 
represents uncertainty about the environment, and controlled cognitive processing allows 
for new representations to be learned so that individuals can adapt their behavior in the 
future (Mushtaq et al., 2011).  
Emotion acts as a catalyst for cognitive control processes. Errors, and the 
uncertainty they signal, are aversive in nature, and conflicts arising between personal 
8 
goals and outcomes elicit negative affect (e.g., wanting to do well in a job interview and 
not receiving a job offer; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). This negative affect plays a causal 
role in the recruitment of cognitive control, allowing an individual to alter behavior, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of repeating errors and increasing certainty about future 
outcomes (Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015). Cognitive control also reciprocally 
impacts emotional experiences through emotion regulation (Lerner et al., 2015; Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005). Emotion regulation encompasses both effortful increases and decreases 
in affect, through cognitive and behavioral strategies (Lewis, 2013).  
Despite findings that both emotion and cognitive control are key to uncertainty 
processing, only one study has examined the effects of emotion regulation on uncertainty 
processing. In two experiments, participants watched movie clips which induced either 
fear or disgust and were prompted to adaptively regulate this emotion through cognitive 
reappraisal, maladaptively regulate through emotional suppression, or not regulate at all. 
During decision-making tasks following the movie clips, participants who used cognitive 
reappraisal demonstrated significantly less aversion to uncertainty and performed better 
on the tasks than participants who suppressed their emotion or did not use an emotion 
regulation strategy (Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). These results 
suggest that individuals who adaptively down-regulate emotions as they arise are less 
averse to uncertainty and more efficient at resolving uncertainty.  
Figure 1 summarizes this review of uncertainty processing. (1) When an 
individual becomes aware that either the information available in the present environment 
or the individual’s existing representations about information in the present environment 
are insufficient to make decisions about the future (2) uncertainty arises. This uncertainty 
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can be expected or unexpected, and people track the causal statistics of events to inform 
processing of uncertainty. Both varieties of uncertainty increase learning rates by 
facilitating (3) emotional processing and (4) cognitive control to form new 
representations or update old representations about the environment and to regulate the 
emotions elicited by uncertainty. The adaptive regulation of affect by higher order 
processes allows for certainty to be reached. Human resolution of uncertainty has thus far 
been studied in the context of decision-making paradigms. (5) Decision-making is 
determined by the interaction of emotional, or affective, processing and controlled, or 
deliberative, processing. 
Figure 1. An illustration of the conditions under which uncertainty arises and is resolved. 
Childhood Uncertainty Processing 
Children differ in both their understanding of uncertainty and their ability to 
resolve it. In middle childhood, children begin to accurately monitor uncertainty (Roderer 
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& Roebers, 2010) and learn that they can use information in the present environment to 
make decisions about the future (Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2011). Adults tend to allocate 
attention toward goal-relevant cues in uncertain environments, but young children are 
less able to identify, and therefore less able to attend to, goal-relevant cues. Rather, they 
scan environments broadly, largely guided by bottom-up information processing, due to 
immature, or weak, cognitive control (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chrysikou, Weber, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2014). While this makes children slower, less accurate and less 
efficient at certain decision-making tasks, young children benefit from less cognitive 
control. Weaker cognitive control encourages exploration and manipulation of 
environments, allowing children to learn statistical regularities in the environment and 
form top-down representations (Chevalier, 2015). As cognitive control develops, children 
learn the meaning of certain cues and increasingly pay attention to these cues, 
reciprocally allowing knowledge to build. Ambiguity poses particular difficulty for 
children, compared to adults, as they are beginning to develop knowledge of cues but still 
depend on environmental salience to guide actions. While older children can infer goals 
from subtler cues, cue transparency influences reaction time (RT) and accuracy through 
adulthood (Logan & Schneider, 2006). Results of eye tracking studies have demonstrated 
that as children age they are less likely to evaluate all available information, and more 
likely to base decisions on only relevant information within uncertain environments 
(Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2013).   
Cognitive control undergoes tremendous development throughout childhood, 
continuing into young adulthood. Cognitive control is difficult for young children, and 
the development of such control is reflected in increasing speed, accuracy and efficiency 
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of complex tasks as children age (Diamond, 2014). Development of cognitive control is 
driven by early growth of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and subsequent pruning of 
unnecessary synapses in later childhood, which allows focalization of function to emerge. 
For example, young children show neural activation in areas unrelated to cognitive 
control on controlled tasks, which decreases into adulthood (Durston et al., 2006). Thus, 
cognitive control has been described as a diffuse, “unitary construct” which becomes 
differentiated with age (Carlson, Zelazo, & Faja, 2013).  
Cognitive control is commonly categorized into three core executive functions 
(EFs): inhibition, including behavioral inhibition and cognitive inhibition, working 
memory, and cognitive flexibility (Miyake et al., 2000). The development of cognitive 
control is characterized by increases in each of these areas, such that children are more 
impulsive and inattentive as compared to adults. Working memory and inhibition 
undergo the greatest development during preschool years (approximately ages three 
through six), while more focalized development of controlled attention, organization and 
flexibility occur during school-age years (approximately ages seven through 13; Carlson 
et al., 2013). During early childhood and preschool years, behavior is driven more by 
environmental stimuli than goals, but this balance changes through middle childhood and 
adolescents, such that adult behavior is more resistant to distraction from environmental 
stimuli and guided by internally held goals.  
Evidence suggests that aspects of cognitive control associated with affect reach 
developmental maturity later than aspects associated with affectively-neutral cognitive 
control (Zelazo & Müller, 2010). Performance on tasks designed to elicit affect during 
decision-making, such as the Iowa Gambling Task, develops slowly into adulthood, 
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whereas performance on affectively-neutral EF tasks, such as Backward Digit Span, 
reaches adult levels in adolescence (Prencipe et al., 2011). Further, individual differences 
in affectively-relevant EFs are more stable than affectively-neutral EFs across 
development (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). On affective decision-making tasks, the ability to 
learn from negative emotional cues (e.g., the aversive affect associated with an error) and 
change one’s behavior accordingly develops with age. Adults are more sensitive to the 
affective response associated with errors, which allows them to learn about the causal 
statistics of the environment more quickly and make more advantageous decisions than 
children under uncertainty (Cauffman et al., 2010). Middle childhood and adolescence 
represent an important period of maturation for emotional processes related to goal-
directed behavior.  
Adults learn to avoid negative outcomes more quickly due to the development of 
cognitive control broadly, and to the development of emotion regulation specifically. 
Emotion regulation develops linearly from middle childhood into adulthood. Cognitive 
reappraisal, for example, a skill which is associated with the ability to tolerate stressful 
events and processes emotions adaptively, increases through young adulthood (Gullone, 
Hughes, King, & Tonge, 2010). The use of emotional suppression, a maladaptive 
emotion regulation associated with reduced positive affect and the maintenance of 
negative emotionality, decreases linearly through childhood and into adulthood as 
adaptive emotion regulation skills come online (Gullone et al., 2010). 
Prior to adolescence, children learn to effectively identify and resolve uncertainty. 
Weaker cognitive control in childhood allows young children to explore their 
environment and facilitates learning, but also makes them less efficient at decision-
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making. As inhibitory and attentional control mature, children are more likely to attend to 
environmental cues that are relevant to their goals and use these cues as information to 
make decisions. With age, children are more able to learn from the negative emotions 
associated with uncertainty, down-regulate these emotions effectively, and make more 
efficient and accurate decisions as a result. Avoidance of uncertainty in childhood may 
limit the development of decision-making skills and contribute to rigid, maladaptive 
patterns of responding to uncertainty.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
IU was originally proposed by Freeston and colleagues as part of an effort to 
elucidate the cognitive processes associated with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; 
Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). IU was measured in this 
seminal study through the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), whose items were 
created based on clinical observations of individuals with GAD (Birrell, Meares, 
Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). The IUS measures cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
reactions to uncertainty with items such as, “Uncertainty stops me from having a strong 
opinion” and “Uncertainty makes life intolerable” (Freeston et al., 1994). The IUS and 
the IUS short form, a 12 question adaptation of the original 27 item measure, continue to 
be the only measures of IU (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007). Given the way the 
IUS was developed, early studies of IU focused exclusively on GAD and worry. Indeed, 
though IU is now linked to a wide range of disorders, it consistently demonstrates a 
unique and robust link to both worry and GAD (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; 
Gentes & Ruscio, 2011).  
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As studies of IU have expanded their scope past worry and GAD, the definition 
has been altered to accommodate updated findings. Following results demonstrating that 
individuals with high IU are more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening, 
as compared to both positive and negative situations, IU was defined as a “cognitive 
vulnerability” (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). Koerner and Dugas (2008) proposed that, as a 
cognitive vulnerability, IU is a causal risk factor for the development of emotional 
disorders, contributes to the etiology of these disorders directly, and is malleable but 
dispositional. IU is separable from personality traits and temperamental risk factors (e.g., 
neuroticism, negative affect) and other cognitive risk factors (e.g., anxiety sensitivity, 
fear of negative evaluation) and predicts disorder symptoms above and beyond these 
related factors (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). IU mediates the relation between neuroticism 
and disorder symptoms such as worry, agoraphobic cognitions, and depression (McEvoy 
& Mahoney, 2012) and represents a “lower order” factor as compared to higher order 
factors such as neuroticism (Carleton, 2016). IU is thus described as the “filter” through 
which psychopathology arises (Shihata et al., 2016). The most updated descriptions of IU 
seek to incorporate this cognitive hypothesis with findings that individuals with high IU 
exhibit physiological, behavioral and emotional differences as well. Carleton (2016a) 
thus proposes that “IU is an individual’s dispositional incapacity to endure the aversive 
response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient information, and 
sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty” (p. 31). 
Characteristics of IU. Though IU has received much attention in anxiety 
disorders literature, elevated levels of IU have been identified among individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), 
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posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Fetzner, Horswill, Boelen, & Carleton, 2013) and 
major depressive disorder (MDD; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). Thus, theories of IU posit that 
it is a transdiagnostic factor associated with emotional disorders broadly (Einstein, 2014). 
Indeed, reductions in IU through treatment are associated with reductions in overall 
impairment associated with emotional disorders (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, 
Farchione, & Barlow, 2013). 
Examinations of IU in relation to similar constructs have allowed characteristics 
of those with IU to emerge. High IU demonstrates a unique association with repetitive 
negative thinking, as compared to similar cognitive processes such as perfectionism and 
perceived control (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013). For instance, in the 
case of anxiety disorders, IU’s relation to symptom severity is mediated by worry, 
whereas IU’s relation to depressive symptoms is mediated by rumination (Yook, Kim, 
Suh, & Lee, 2010). Reductions in IU predict reductions in worry over time, providing 
evidence that among adults the inability to tolerate uncertainty may cause worry (Bomyea 
et al., 2015). High IU is also associated with a reduced ability to extinguish learned fear 
associations, such that individuals with high IU maintain fear responses during extinction 
paradigms while those with low IU do not (Morriss, Christakou, & van Reekum, 2016). 
Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson and Freeston (2011) point out in their review that 
researchers have focused on validating the construct of IU, with little attention to the 
phenomenology and development of IU. Indeed, IU as a construct did not develop 
through investigations of the nature of uncertainty, and the nature of distress caused by 
this uncertainty, but through observations of those with an active and specific emotional 
disorder. Carleton’s (2016a) definition highlights the etiological nature of IU by 
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proposing that IU arises through distress to responses elicited by uncertainty, and is 
maintained through the continued perception of uncertainty. Dispositional IU likely 
contributes to individual differences in uncertainty processing, which then impact the 
development of psychopathology.  
Individual differences in uncertainty processing. Emotions are both 
information and informational regulators (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). Fear and 
anxiety are more closely associated with uncertainty than other emotions such as 
happiness or anger, and thus fear and anxiety facilitate the acquisition of information 
under uncertainty (Frey, Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 2014). This relation is reciprocal, as 
previously described, and perceived uncertainty also increases affect (Bar-Anan et al., 
2009). Some have proposed that individual differences in uncertainty tolerance underlie 
all clinically significant experiences of anxiety (Carleton, 2012). The Uncertainty and 
Anticipation Model of Anxiety (UAMA) proposes a neurobiological and psychological 
framework through which individual differences in physiology, emotion, behavior and 
cognition interact to explain anxious reactions to uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). 
Though this model does not explicitly address IU, Grupe and Nitschke (2013) suggest 
that IU may represent the collection of “exaggerated physiological and subjective 
emotional responses to uncertainty” (p. 10). It can be hypothesized, then, that individual 
differences in emotional experiences and emotional processing, as in the case of 
emotional disorders, are likely linked to individual differences in uncertainty processing. 
Thus, the following section reviews individual differences in uncertainty processing. 
Given the specific link between anxiety and uncertainty, this section focuses on these 
individual differences in uncertainty processing within anxiety and anxiety disorders.   
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Individual differences in emotion under uncertainty. Emotions are a necessary 
and integral aspect of decision-making under uncertainty (Lerner et al., 2015). 
Individuals with high IU require more information before reaching a decision 
(Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997) and may experience increases in affect under 
uncertainty, above and beyond the increased affect experienced by those with low IU, as 
a means of increasing the salience of relevant cues in the environment. Adults with high 
IU interpret ambiguous information as more threatening than overtly positive, negative or 
neutral information. This suggests that among adults with high IU, uncertainty itself may 
serve as a fear cue, which increases negative affect specifically (Oglesby, Raines, Short, 
Capron, & Schmidt, 2016). Only one study of emotion and IU has differentiated between 
expected and unexpected uncertainty. High IU individuals relative to low IU individuals 
showed increased negative affect and biased threat appraisals toward unexpected 
uncertainty specifically, rather than toward expected uncertainty or uncertainty broadly 
(Chen & Lovibond, 2016). Though all individuals exhibit a greater aversion to ambiguity, 
as compared to risk, when potential losses are high (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphus, Tranel, & 
Camerer, 2005), individuals with high IU may overvalue threat associated with ambiguity 
and delay or avoid decision-making as a result (Hartley & Phelps, 2013). 
Individual differences in cognitive control under uncertainty. Only one study 
has examined cognitive control among those with high IU, however, a large body of 
literature has emerged regarding cognitive control among those with anxiety disorders 
and may inform our understanding of cognitive control related to IU specifically. 
However, these studies primarily rely on threat and neutral paradigms, leaving little know 
about cognitive processes under uncertainty. It is well established that individuals with 
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anxiety disorders display characteristic attentional biases to threat (for a review see Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Attentional 
biases are comprised of (1) facilitated attention toward threat, (2) difficulty in 
disengagement from threat once identified and (3) attentional avoidance of threat (Cisler 
& Koster, 2011). Attentional control and emotion regulation are the aspects of cognitive 
control underlying difficulty in disengagement and attentional avoidance, respectively.  
Attentional control is said to regulate bottom-up biases to threat, such that 
individuals with anxiety disorders have weaker attentional control and therefore more 
difficulty shifting attention away from threat once it has been identified (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2011). Threat can refer to external stimuli or 
internal cues, such as physiological and emotional experiences, or threatening imagery 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This weakened attentional control is 
present in neutral environments as well, and individuals with high trait anxiety are slower 
to attend to relevant cues when incongruent, but non-threatening, distractors are present 
(Bishop, 2009). Only one study has examined attentional differences in the context of IU. 
Participants in this study completed an Attention Network Task which demonstrated 
significant attentional differences between those with high and low IU such that 
individuals with high IU demonstrated increased attentional biases (Fergus & Carleton, 
2015). 
Individual differences in the cognitive control of emotion under uncertainty. 
Similarly, little is known about emotion regulation in the context of IU specifically. In the 
only study of IU and ER, IU was associated with experiential avoidance and distress 
about emotions even when controlling for negative affect, suggesting that worry and 
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attentional avoidance may arise as a response to the internal states associated with 
uncertainty (Lee, Orsillo, Roemer, & Allen, 2010). Emotion regulation among those with 
GAD, the disorder most closely related to IU, has been widely studied however. 
Individuals with anxiety disorders are much more likely to employ maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies that serve to maintain or increase emotional experiences (Turk, 
Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). Specifically, those with GAD show 
increased intensity of emotions, greater reactivity to these emotions, and a reduced ability 
to self-soothe once emotions are experienced (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). 
As described previously, negative affect facilitates controlled information processing. In 
the case of highly anxious individuals, negative affect facilitates perseverative worry, 
rather than productive deliberation (Dash, Meeten, & Davey, 2013). Worry has been 
conceptualized as a maladaptive problem-solving process, whereby individuals respond 
to problems with repetitive iterations of potential negative outcomes rather than 
productively engaging in solution generation and selection (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & 
Fresco, 2002). Evidence also suggests that worry may increase negative affect among 
those with GAD (McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007) and maintain emotional 
disorders by preventing the productive processing of emotions (Newman, Llera, 
Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013). Though individual differences in emotion 
regulation among those with high IU warrants further investigation, the characterization 
of emotion regulation among those with GAD may suggest that IU is also associated with 
reliance on maladaptive emotion regulation strategies.  
Integrating uncertainty processing and IU. Figure 2 represents a proposed 
model through which dispositional IU contributes to maladaptive cognitive and emotional 
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processing of uncertainty, increasing distress associated with uncertainty and reciprocally 
maintaining high IU levels. Unlike Figure 1, Figure 2 begins with (1) IU, a factor which 
increases vigilance toward uncertainty and (2) biases an individual’s likelihood of 
perceiving uncertainty (Wever, Smeets, & Sternheim, 2015) due in part to lagging base 
rate calculations of statistics in the environment. Therefore, (3) uncertainty may be 
perceived in situations when those without high IU would not continue to perceive 
uncertainty. As with all individuals, uncertainty leads to increased affect. In the case of 
individuals with high IU, this affect arises more frequently, and is more likely to increase 
negative affect in general and (4) anxiety specifically. Uncertainty increases anxiety, 
which reciprocally increases perceptions of uncertainty. For individuals with high IU who 
demonstrate difficulties with cognitive control and emotion regulation, uncertainty also 
leads to maladaptive cognitive processing. (5) Worry, emotional and cognitive avoidance, 
and emotional suppression arise in response to uncertainty and contribute to further 
increases in or maintenance of anxiety. The anxious response to uncertainty coupled with 
an increase in negative affect through maladaptive cognitive control and emotion 
regulation leads to symptoms of psychopathology (e.g., emotional reactivity, avoidance, 
repetitive negative thought) ultimately maintaining or increasing (1) intolerance of 
uncertainty.  
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Figure 2. A proposed model of the conditions under which maladaptive uncertainty 
processing leads to the maintenance of IU. 
IU in Children 
Childhood IU is a relatively new field of study facilitated by the creation of the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (IUSC; Comer et al., 2009).The IUSC is an 
adaptation of the IUS with child and parent report versions. Though the IUSC 
demonstrates acceptable reliability and validity, the measure may be difficult to complete 
for young children. One study found that significantly fewer six to eight-year-olds were 
able to complete the IUSC as compared to older children (Cowie, Clementi, & Alfano, 
2016) suggesting that younger children may not be able to adequately reflect on and 
report their reactions to uncertainty. This again highlights the methodological issue of 
reliance on questionnaires to examine IU. One group has attempted to address this issue 
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by creating a parent report questionnaire aimed at assessing very young children’s 
behavior in uncertain situations (Sanchez et al., 2017).  
Child IU characteristics. High IU in childhood is associated with GAD and, to a 
lesser extent, other anxiety disorders as well (Hearn, Donovan, Spence, & March, 2017). 
IUSC scores predict children’s self-reported anxiety severity (Read, Comer, & Kendall, 
2013). A recent examination of the specific relation between childhood GAD and IU 
revealed that children with GAD and another comorbid anxiety disorder had the highest 
levels of IU as compared to children with pure GAD or another anxiety disorder. This 
study also found that worry but not GAD predicted increases in IU beyond the effects of 
overall anxiety (Cowie et al., 2016). This result suggests that IU in childhood may be 
more related to underlying cognitive and emotional processes, rather than to diagnoses 
themselves. Through development, IU may eventually relate directly to psychopathology, 
as is seen in adults with emotional disorders. However, given the association between IU 
and GAD found in previous studies, further research is required to test this hypothesis.  
Studies of child IU in relation to cognitive and emotional processes have 
primarily focused on extending adult models of IU to child populations. These studies 
have found that, as in adults, child IU and worry are significantly and uniquely related as 
compared to similar psychological constructs (Fialko, Bolton, & Perrin, 2012; Kertz & 
Woodruff-Borden, 2013). Though IU seems to be a causal factor in anxiety symptoms 
among adults, the relation appears bidirectional among adolescents. A five-year 
longitudinal study of worry and IU among adolescents found that worry mediated IU 
over time and IU also mediated worry over time. Thus, IU and worry impact each other 
reciprocally in adolescence. Those who are still developing may learn worry as a 
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response to uncertainty, while, reciprocally, worry makes uncertainty less tolerable 
(Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012).  
Beyond these studies, relatively little is known about children with high IU. 
Because high IU is associated with increases in anxiety severity we can hypothesize that 
uncertainty processing among children with greater anxiety may inform our 
understanding of uncertainty processing among children with greater IU. It is very likely 
that anxiety and IU, especially in childhood, are separable and arise from related but 
different pathways. However, given the dearth of research on childhood IU, uncertainty 
processing among children with high IU and anxious children are both examined here. 
Individual differences in uncertainty processing among children. Converging 
evidence from multiple methodologies suggests that differences in uncertainty processing 
are associated with IU among children. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
results from youth with high and low IU suggest that differences in neural pathways 
activated during uncertainty tasks are correlated with IU severity (Krain et al., 2008). 
This study also showed that, among anxious youth who differ in IU severity but not 
overall anxiety or worry levels, anxious youth with high IU show significantly delayed 
RTs on uncertain decision-making tasks and greater activity in brain areas associated 
with uncertainty processing than anxious youth with low IU. RTs on uncertainty tasks are 
predictive of IU levels but are not sufficiently predictive of anxiety symptoms among 
children (Brown et al., 2014). It is possible that differences in RTs are related to 
uncertainty processing differences rather than the interference of anxiety among anxious 
children. 
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Child anxiety disorders and maladaptive uncertainty processing. Children with 
anxiety disorders experience characteristic emotional, emotion regulation and cognitive 
differences as compared to non-anxious children. Children with anxiety disorders tend to 
experience negative emotions more often than peers and are more reactive to these 
emotions (Tan et al., 2012). They experience difficulty regulating their emotions and are 
more likely to rely on suppression or avoidance rather than adaptive emotion regulation 
skills (Folk, Zeman, Poon, & Dallaire, 2014). Emotion regulation has long been 
considered a predictor of general childhood psychopathology (Keenan, 2000) and 
reliance on suppression specifically in response to negative emotions causally contributes 
to increased anxiety symptoms (Folk et al., 2014). This difficulty with top-down control 
of emotions reflects difficulty with cognitive control overall for anxious children. 
Children with anxiety disorders show executive attention dysfunction on par with 
children diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Mogg et al., 2015). 
Individual differences in cognitive control early in life are predictive of outcomes in 
adulthood (Moffitt et al., 2011) and while cognitive control continues to develop into 
young adulthood, individual differences remain stable (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Thus, 
individual differences in cognitive control among children with high IU predict lifelong 
differences in cognitive control, and likely impact the development of psychopathology.  
Child IU methods of study. IU in childhood is typically examined through use of 
the IUSC and questionnaire measures of related factors such as anxiety and worry. Child 
anxiety in these studies is quantified through use of questionnaires, such as the Revised 
Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale(RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1997), or 
diagnostic interviews, such as the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, 
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child and parent versions(ADIS-IV-C/P; Albano & Silverman, 1996), while worry is best 
captured with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire—Child Version (PSWQ-C; Chorpita, 
Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997). Studies have primarily relied on cross-
sectional data to examine the relation between IU and psychopathology symptoms, and 
the characteristics of those with high IU (Osmanagaoglu, Creswell, & Dodd, 2017). One 
study has examined IU and related factors longitudinally to test the dispositional nature 
of IU and the causal nature of IU in relation to psychopathology symptoms (Dugas et al., 
2012). Only one study has employed an experimental task to examine the behavioral 
correlates of IU in children. Children in this study completed a decision-making game 
with varying uncertainty conditions, and were asked to rate their anxiety and subjective 
certainty following the game. This study also used functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) to identify separable patterns of neural activation related to uncertainty 
processing that distinguished children with high and low IU (Krain et al., 2008).  
Other studies of uncertainty processing in childhood exist, but have not measured 
IU or examined individual differences in uncertainty processing. These studies typically 
employ decision-making paradigms that vary based on the following domains. Among 
decision-making studies that do not include emotional components, a task may be 
presented that varies based on the number of distractors or the salience of the cue. The 
task typically also contains a probabilistic component, whereby known and unknown 
probabilities are varied to measure differences between these conditions. When emotion 
is integrated into a decision-making study, emotion may be incidental or integral to the 
task. Incidental emotions are typically induced prior to decision-making, while integral 
emotions may involve making a decision about the value of threatening or neutral stimuli. 
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Across these studies, measured outcomes include: RT and accuracy under varied 
conditions; neural activation associated with valuation or probabilistic computation; and 
eye-tracking data indicating how children attend to environments and process information 
when making decisions.  
The Current Study 
   Though current studies have provided valuable evidence concerning the 
characteristics of children with high IU, several limitations are present. Little is known 
about how IU impacts individuals’ behavior under uncertainty, and even less is known 
about how children with high IU behave under uncertainty. While the link between 
psychopathology and IU is well established, and interventions targeting IU have shown 
preliminary success in reducing psychopathology symptoms, it is yet unclear why this 
relation exists. It is likely that individuals with high IU employ maladaptive behavioral 
and cognitive processes when faced with uncertainty that contribute to the emergence of 
psychopathology (Shihata et al., 2016). However, this theory remains untested due to the 
paucity of research exploring the relations between IU and behavioral and cognitive 
processes associated with uncertainty resolution and decision-making.  
Pre-adolescence appears to be a critical period for developing the ability to 
distinguish between threat and safety in the presence of ambiguous stimuli (Pine & Fox, 
2015), and learning to demarcate clear threat categories by inhibiting fear responses to 
ambiguous stimuli (J. Y. Lau et al., 2011). IU likely contributes to differences in 
uncertainty processing, which increase distress in the presence of uncertainty, and 
reciprocally maintain IU. Understanding how those with high IU respond to and process 
uncertainty and ambiguously threatening stimuli in childhood, prior to the maturation of 
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cognitive control, may inform our understanding of how IU and broad psychopathology 
relate, and how clinical interventions can target IU across disorders and among those with 
comorbidities. The current study aims to begin addressing gaps in our knowledge of the 
individual differences in behaviors and cognitive processes associated with IU and 
psychopathology symptoms in childhood. As IU most strongly relates to anxiety 
disorders, the proposed study examines IU in children with and without anxiety disorders, 
and related symptoms, specifically. 
Study aims and hypotheses. 
Aim 1. Examine the behavioral and cognitive correlates of high IU in children. 
Hypothesis 1. Child IU will predict behavior and attention on a decision-making 
task, such that higher IU will be associated with slower RTs, more time spent looking at 
distractors, and more incorrect responses. Child IU will also predict differences in 
executive function and ER, such that high IU will be associated with weaker attentional 
and emotional control. 
Aim 2. Understand how ambiguous threat affects behavior and cognition for 
children with high IU, as compared to overtly threatening or neutral conditions. 
Hypothesis 2. Children with high IU will exhibit slower RTs, spend more time 
looking at distractors, and respond incorrectly more often in ambiguous environments as 
compared to overtly threatening or neutral conditions, while children with low IU will not 
experience differences by condition. 
Aim 3. Test the hypothesized link between IU and anxiety disorder symptoms in 
childhood. 
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Hypothesis 3a. Child IU will predict levels or worry and anxiety, such that higher 
IU corresponds to higher worry and anxiety. 
Hypothesis 3b. The relation between child IU and psychopathology symptoms 
will be moderated by attentional and emotional control, such that higher IU will predict 
weaker attentional and emotional control, which will predict higher worry and anxiety 
levels.  
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METHOD 
Recruitment 
This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Louisville’s Internal 
Review Board (Approval # 16.0054). Families were recruited from schools and 
throughout the Louisville community. Digital advertising was distributed through the 
University of Louisville’s email announcement system. Flyers describing the study were 
distributed to Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) personnel to distribute to parents 
of children within the study’s targeted age range. Flyers were also distributed to Catholic 
school personnel, other private school staff, and members of a local home-school co-
operative. School personnel were encouraged to distribute flyers to parents of both 
anxious and non-anxious children, as the study aimed to recruit a community sample. 
Flyers were also posted in community locations such as coffee shops, libraries, and 
pediatrician’s offices. Digital versions of study flyers were distributed on Facebook to 
Louisville parenting groups. Flyers contained information about the study including a 
brief description and study personnel contact information. To ensure recruitment of both 
anxious and non-anxious youth, one version of the flyer described the study as an 
investigation of worry in youth, while another version described the study as an 
investigation of decision-making and emotions.  
The required sample size was calculated a priori using GPower version 3.0.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Regarding hypotheses 1 and 2, large effect 
sizes have been identified between measures of IU and decision-making behavioral tasks, 
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including response latencies (Thibodeau, Carleton, Gómez-Pérez, & Asmundson, 2013) 
and accuracy (Carleton et al., 2016). Medium effect sizes have been identified among 
children with anxiety disorders on go/no-go tasks measuring response inhibition (Wright, 
Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah, & Schachar, 2014). Medium effect sizes have also 
been identified among children with anxiety disorders when comparing attentional bias in 
threatening and neutral conditions (Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015). Regarding 
hypothesis 3, large effect sizes have been identified in studies predicting worry and 
anxiety from IUSC scores (Osmanagaoglu et al., 2017). To achieve power of .8, with α = 
.05, a sample size of 42 was necessary to detect a medium to large effect size for 
Hypotheses 1 and 3. To achieve power of .8, with α = .05, a sample size of 17 per IU 
group, for a total of 34 participants, was necessary to detect a medium effect size for 
Hypothesis 2. Thus, a total of 42 children were required for this study.  
Procedure 
 Parents of eligible children were invited to schedule an appointment of 
approximately three hours duration in the study’s research lab. Prior to their scheduled 
appointment, parents were emailed a link to the consent form explaining the study 
purpose and procedure. Study personnel contacted parents by telephone to explain the 
consent and answer any questions. Once parents electronically signed the consent they 
were directed to the study questionnaires and received a second email containing the 
study assent for their child to sign. After the child signed the study assent they were 
directed through the study questionnaires. Questionnaires were completed prior to the 
appointment to lessen the burden of time each family spent in the research lab. Study 
questionnaires and collected data were managed by REDCap, a HIPAA compliant 
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research tool that allows each dyad’s data to be linked to a study identification number 
for confidentiality. Questionnaires not completed at home were completed during the 
appointment.  
When families arrived for their appointment, consents and questionnaires were 
checked for completeness, and questions about the measures were discussed. 
Confidentiality was explained to children at a developmentally appropriate level. During 
the appointment, children and parents individually completed the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, child and parent versions (ADIS-IV-C/P). These 
diagnostic interviews were administered by trained study personnel supervised by a 
licensed clinical psychologist to determine the presence or absence of anxiety and related 
disorders. Following the interviews, children completed an eye-tracking computer task. 
Families were compensated for their time with a report regarding the results of the 
diagnostic interviews, including the child’s anxiety status and social and emotional 
functioning. Treatment referrals and recommendations were provided as appropriate for 
children meeting diagnostic criteria.  
Participants 
Participants were 47 children 7 to 13 years old (M = 9.21, SD = 1.88) and their 
parents. Eligibility was limited to children with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
without any known developmental disabilities or delays or Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Children were 21 boys (45%) and 26 girls (55%). The 
majority of children were European American (89%) from households with a reported 
annual income of $60,000 or more (75%). Twenty-three (50%) children met criteria for a 
primary anxiety disorder diagnosis and 15 of these children met criteria for a secondary 
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anxiety disorder diagnosis. Of the primary anxiety disorder diagnoses, generalized 
anxiety disorder was the most common, N = 10, followed by social anxiety disorder, N = 
6. Girls were significantly more likely to receive an anxiety disorder diagnosis, X2 (1, N = 
45) = 5.02, p = .025.  
Measures 
Anxiety measures.  
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, child and parent versions 
(ADIS-IV-C/P). Child diagnostic status was assessed using the ADIS-IV-C/P (Albano & 
Silverman, 1996). The ADIS-IV-C/P assesses a broad range of anxiety, mood, and 
externalizing disorders in youth (ages 7-17) and screens for the presence of additional 
disorders including developmental, psychotic, and somatoform disorders. The ADIS-IV-
C/P also assesses age of onset, impairment and avoidance and has been described as the 
premier instrument for assessing anxiety disorders in youth (Stallings & March, 1995). 
Impairment ratings are generated for each diagnosis using the Clinician Severity Rating 
(CSR, range = 0-8; ≥4 required to assign a diagnosis). The ADIS-IV-C/P possesses the 
best psychometric profile for the diagnostic assessment of childhood anxiety disorders of 
available diagnostic measures (Silverman & Nelles, 1988; Silverman, Saavedra, & Pina, 
2001) and is sensitive to prevention and treatment effects (Dadds, Atkinson, Turner, 
Blums, & Lendich, 1999; Kendall et al., 1997). Diagnoses are derived by the interviewer 
based on child and parent report. Each ADIS-IV-C/P evaluation was supervised by a 
licensed clinical psychologist and discrepancies were reconciled during supervision. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory—Youth (BAI-Y). The BAI-Y is an adaptation of the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 2005). The BAI-Y is a 20-item self-report 
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scale measuring children’s anxious beliefs (e.g., “I am afraid that I might get sick”), 
cognitions (e.g., “I worry I might go crazy”), and physiological responses (e.g., “My 
hands shake”). Each item asks the child to respond with whether they experienced the 
statement “never” “sometimes” “often” or “always” in the past two weeks. The BAI-Y 
produces a raw score, which is transformed to a T-score using the child’s age and gender. 
BAI-Y T-scores were used for all calculations in this study. The BAI-Y has demonstrated 
convergent validity with other measures of anxiety in children, such as the RCMAS, as 
well as high test-retest reliability (r = 0.64-0.88). The possible range of T-scores on this 
measure is 31 to 100. Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety.   
Penn State Worry Questionnaire—Child Version (PSWQ-C). The PSWQ-C is 
an adaptation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire  (PSWQ; Chorpita, Tracey, Brown, 
Collica, & Barlow, 1997). The PSWQ-C is a 14-item self-report scale measuring worry 
(e.g., “My worries really bother me,” “Many things make me worry”). Each item asks the 
child to respond with whether a description is “never true,” “sometimes true,” “most 
times true,” or “always true.” The PSWQ-C has demonstrated convergent validity with 
other child worry measures, such as the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale 
Worry/Oversensitivity subscale, and high test-retest reliability (r = .92). The PSWQ-C 
also demonstrates discriminant validity for children with and without clinical worry, and 
between children with GAD and other anxiety disorders. Children with GAD report 
significantly higher worry (M=24.09) than children with other anxiety disorders 
(M=18.89) and healthy controls (M=12.96; Pestle, Chorpita, & Schiffman, 2008). The 
possible range of scores on this measure is 0 to 42. Higher scores on this scale indicate 
higher levels of worry.  
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Temperament in Middle Childhood Questionnaire (TMCQ). The TMCQ is a 
paper-and-pencil parent-report of temperament in children 7-10 years of age. The TMCQ 
was based on the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart et al., 2001), a well-
established caregiver report measure of temperament for children 3-7 years old. The 
TMCQ contains 16 scales comprised of 157 items and requires 20-25 minutes to 
complete. Internal consistency for the parent-report ranges from .63 to .90. The Negative 
Affect (NA) subscale was calculated according to the methodology by Kotelnikova, 
Olino, Klein, Mackrell, and Hayden (2017). 
Executive function measure. 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Parent Form (BRIEF). The 
BRIEF is an 86-item questionnaire, consisting of eight subscales (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & 
Kenworthy, 2000). Each item asks the parent to respond with whether a description is 
“never true,” “sometimes true” or “often true” for their child. The eight-item Shift 
subscale was used to measure attentional control. The Shift subscale measures the extent 
to which a child can move attention freely and flexibly from one situation or task to 
another (e.g., “Has a short attention span,” “Thinks too much about the same topic”). 
Children low in Shift may experience more difficulty problem solving and be described 
as inflexible or rigid. This subscale shows high test-retest reliability in both clinical and 
normative samples. The possible range of scores on this scale is 8 to 24 and higher scores 
on this measure indicate greater difficulty shifting attention.  The 10-item Emotional 
Control subscale was used to measure emotional control. The Emotional Control subscale 
measures how well a child can regulate their own emotional responses to situations (e.g., 
“Becomes tearful easily,” “Angry or tearful outbursts are intense but end suddenly”). 
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Children low in emotional control may display more frequent and dramatic mood 
changes. The possible range of scores on this scale is 10 to 30, and higher scores indicate 
more difficulty with emotional control. Though a new version of the BRIEF was recently 
released, the updates to this measure primarily served to eliminate items that decreased 
the sensitivity and specificity of identifying youth with attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (BRIEF-2; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2016). Thus, the original measure 
was used in the current study. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty measures. 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (IUSC). The IUSC is an 
adaptation of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Comer et al., 2009). The IUSC is 
a 27-item self-report scale measuring negative emotional, cognitive and behavioral 
reactions to uncertain situations and events (e.g., “Not knowing what will happen in the 
future makes life hard, “Surprise events upset me greatly.”) Each item asks the child to 
indicate how well a statement describes them on a scale from one to 5, where one is “Not 
at all,” three is “Somewhat,” and five is “Very much.” The IUSC has demonstrated 
convergent validity with measures of anxiety and worry including the Multidimensional 
Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC) and the PSWQ-C. The IUSC has also demonstrated 
acceptable utility in distinguishing youth with anxiety disorders from healthy controls, 
with a cut score of 50 to 54 correctly classifying 80% of youth with anxiety disorders 
(Comer et al., 2009). Youth with GAD tend to report higher levels of IU (M=66.61) than 
youth with other anxiety disorders (M=59.49; Read et al., 2013). The possible range of 
scores on this measure 27 to 135 with higher scores indicating higher levels of IU (Comer 
et al., 2009). 
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Modified attention task. A modified version of the Test Battery of Attention 
Performance—Child Version (KITAP; Zimmermann, Fimm, & Gondan, 2002) was 
completed by children in this study. Children completed this task in front of a television 
screen positioned above a remote eye-tracker (EYE-TRAC 6 Desktop from Applied 
Science Laboratories) and view a calibration event prior to completing the task. The task, 
as adapted in Roebers, Schmid, and Roderer (2010), required children to respond (go) or 
inhibit response (no-go) based on a target stimuli, while ignoring distractor stimuli. The 
stimuli consisted of an underwater scene in which a submarine (containing the target) 
was attempting to return to the surface surrounded by sharks and dolphins (distractors). 
Past eye-tracking studies of attention and anxiety have used images of sharks to elicit 
emotion among both anxious and non-anxious adults and youth (Finucane & Power, 
2010; Kempe, Rookes, & Swarbrigg, 2013; Allison M. Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-
Gembeck, & Craske, 2008). In this version of the KITAP, distractor stimuli were either 
neutral (two dolphins with happy faces), threatening (two sharks with angry faces) or 
ambiguous (one happy dolphin and one angry shark). Children were told to help the 
submarine return to the surface by pressing the space bar with their dominant hand as fast 
as they could when the porthole turned green, and waiting when the porthole turned red. 
Each trial began with a fixation period of 800 ms during which the scenery and 
submarine appeared, then a distractor period of 400 ms during which the two distractors 
were present, then a target period of 800 ms during which the porthole changed to green 
or red. Children had a chance to practice with 12 trials (four neutral, four threatening, 
four distractors) after instructions, then completed three blocks of 12 trials, of which half 
were “go” and half were “no-go”.  
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Accuracy and response latencies were recorded, as well as time spent looking at 
the areas of interest (AOIs; i.e., target, threatening distractor, neutral distractor). Though 
the original task examined only accuracy and response latencies, recent research suggests 
that eye tracking indices of attentional bias are more reliable indicators than RT (Gibb, 
Mcgeary, & Beevers, 2016). Further, the use of both RTs and eye movement allows for 
examination of bias in both covert and overt attention (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 
2008). Dwell duration (i.e., time spent looking within an AOI) was examined as a 
proportion with the cumulative dwell duration for each AOI divided by the total dwell 
duration over the course of the task to account for individual differences in total dwell 
duration not related to the variables of interest (e.g., data lost due to blink, head shift, 
etc.). This approach to data reduction has been used previously in studies investigating 
controlled aspects of visual attention among anxious youth (Price et al., 2016; Shechner 
et al., 2017). 
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RESULTS 
Preliminary Examination of Measures 
Eye gaze data did not record for five children total: four due to hardware failure 
and one due to prescription glasses worn during the study task that created a glare and 
prevented accurate eye gaze recording. Additionally, two parents did not complete the 
entire demographic questionnaire. Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR; 
Little, 1988) test was nonsignificant, p = .40, indicating that data were MCAR. Missing 
data were therefore addressed using pairwise deletion (Beaujean, 2012).   
Preliminary Analysis 
Descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations for the current sample are 
displayed in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Independent Samples T Tests Comparing Children 
with and without Anxiety Disorders on Study Measures 
Sample Mean (SD) Anxious (SD) Non-anxious (SD) T 
IUS-C 61.43 (21.53) 72.02 (20.57) 51.16 (17.38) -3.90*** 
BAI-Y-T 51.22 (10.54) 56.17 (7.89) 46.36 (10.89) -3.78*** 
PSWQ-C 18.83 (9.10) 24.83 (5.90) 13.05 (7.80) -6.09*** 
BRIEF-Shift 13.77 (3.95) 15.72 (3.49) 11.72 (3.40) -4.06*** 
BRIEF-EC 18.71 (5.84) 21.61 (5.00) 15.68 (5.13) -4.07*** 
TMCQ-NA 2.44 (0.55) 2.66 (0.38) 2.24 (0.61) -3.83*** 
Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of Uncertainty Questionnaire—Child; BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for 
Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; BRIEF = Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Function; EC = Emotional Control; TMCQ-NA = Temperament in Middle 
Childhood Questionnaire—Negative Affect subscale. 
*** p < .001 
The IUS-C demonstrated excellent reliability in the current sample (Cronbach’s α 
= .94). Children with anxiety disorders reported IUS-C scores somewhat higher than past 
investigations of children with any anxiety disorder (i.e., M = 64.97) and comparable to 
studies of children with multiple comorbid anxiety disorders (i.e., M = 71.69; Cowie, 
Clementi, & Alfano, 2016) while the non-clinical children reported IUS-C scores 
comparable to non-anxious community youth (i.e., M = 52.81; Comer et al., 2009). The 
BAI-Y demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .87). Children with anxiety 
disorders reported BAI-Y T-scores comparable to past studies of children with a principal 
anxiety diagnosis (i.e., M = 59.00) and non-clinical children reported scores comparable 
to past samples of non-anxious youth (i.e., M = 48.20; Beck, Beck, Jolly, & Steer, 2005). 
The PSWQ-C demonstrated excellent reliability in the current sample (Cronbach’s α = 
.90). Children with anxiety disorders reported PSWQ-C scores comparable to past studies 
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of youth with a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (i.e., M = 24.09) and non-
clinical children reported scores comparable to past samples of youth without an anxiety 
diagnosis (i.e., M = 12.96; Pestle, Chorpita, & Schiffman, 2008).  
The BRIEF demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α = .98) overall. The 
Shift subscale demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .84) while the EC subscale 
demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α = .93). No psychometric norms are 
available for anxious samples, however, the Shift (i.e., M = 11.34-11.99) and EC (i.e., M 
= 14.81-16.39) subscale scores in the non-anxious group were comparable to community 
samples (Gioia et al., 2000). The TMCQ demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α 
= .91). No psychometric norms are available for the TMCQ, however, means in the 
current sample were comparable to community samples (i.e., M = 2.32-3.66;  
Kotelnikova et al., 2017). 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that child gender was related to PSWQ-C 
score such that girls reported significantly more worry than boys, t(45) = -2.47, p = .017. 
Child gender was also related to TMCQ and BRIEF-Shift scores such that girls 
demonstrated significantly greater negative affect, t(45) = -2.32, p = .025, and 
significantly greater difficulties with attentional control than boys, t(45) = -2.03, p = .049. 
Child gender was related to target dwell duration, t(40) = -2.34, p = .032, such that girls 
were relatively less likely to attend to the target and ignore distractors as compared to 
boys, and marginally related to RT, t(45) = -1.99, p = .053, such that girls were relatively 
slower to respond than boys. Child age was not related to any study variables. Child 
gender was held as a covariate throughout hypothesis testing. 
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Negative affect (NA) is considered a higher-order, temperamental trait that 
predicts IU (Carleton, 2016) and anxiety disorder symptoms (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012. 
Because temperament represents stable individual differences in emotion, cognition, and 
behavior across environments, NA was explored as a possible control variable. The 
relation between RT and NA was marginally significant, r(45) = .28, p = .067, however, 
when controlling for gender this relation became nonsignificant p =.41. NA did not 
predict any other task variables (i.e., dwell durations, accuracy) and so it was not used in 
further analyses. 
Model assumptions. Normality of the variables was assessed by inspecting 
histograms and through use of skewness and kurtosis z-scores. All questionnaire scores 
(i.e., IUS-C, BAI-Y T, PSWQ-C, BRIEF, TMCQ) were normally distributed. RTs 
exhibited positive skew, which was appropriately reduced with logarithmic 
transformations. Dwell durations on distractors also exhibited positive skew, which was 
appropriately reduced with logarithmic transformations. Target dwell duration exhibited 
negative skew, which was appropriately reduced with an arcsine transformation. 
Transformed variables were used for hypothesis testing.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1: IU predicts behavior and attention. Bivariate correlations 
conducted between IUS-C scores, covariates, and task outcome variables are displayed in 
Table 2.  
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients Between IUS-C, Task Outcomes, and Covariates 
Behavior Attention Covariates 
IUS-C Accuracy RT Target dwell Threat dwell Neutral dwell Age Gender 
IUS-C 
Accuracy -.22 
RT .36* .02 
Target dwell -.34* .03 .08 
Threat dwell .32* -.06 .04 -.84** 
Neutral dwell .29 -.09 -.17 -.85** .58** 
Age -.04 .24 -.25 -.12 .07 .10 
Gender .20 .31 .31* .15 -.17 -.10 -.16 
Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of uncertainty questionnaire—child; RT = Overall average RT 
*p < .05, ** p < .01
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IUS-C was related to average overall RT, r(47) = .36, p = .012, target dwell 
duration, r(42) = -.34, p = .015, and threat dwell duration, r(42) = .32, p = .043. 
Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted to explore these relations controlling for 
gender. IUS-C explained a significant proportion of variance in RT, R2 = .17, F(2, 44) = 
4.24, β = .32, p = .028. IUS-C significantly predicted target dwell duration, R2 = .097, 
F(2, 39) = 3.74, β = -.41, p = .011, and threat dwell duration, R2 = .10, F(2, 39) = 4.38, β 
= .35, p = .029. 
Bivariate correlations conducted between IUS-C scores, BRIEF subscales, and 
covariates are displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients between Study Measures and Covariates 
Anxiety symptoms BRIEF Covariates 
IUS-C BAI-Y-T PSWQ-C Shift EC Age Gender 
IUS-C 
BAI-Y-T .71** 
PSWQ-C .66** .66** 
Shift .44** .63** .44** 
EC .49** .59** .39** .76**  
Age -.04 .02 .05 -.13 -.10 
Gender .20 .24 .02* -.31* -.23 -.16 
Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of uncertainty questionnaire—child; BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for 
Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; EC = Emotional Control 
*p < .05, ** p < .01
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IUS-C was related to Shift, r(47) = .44, p = .003, and EC, r(47) = .49, p = .001. 
Hierarchical linear regressions indicated that, when controlling for gender differences, 
IUS-C significantly predicted Shift, R2 = .24, F(2, 44) = 6.71, β = .40, p = .005, and EC, 
R2 = .24, F(2, 44) = 13.29, β = .49, p = .001.  
Hypothesis 2: High IU is associated with differences in attention and 
behavior under ambiguously threatening conditions. To test differences in attention 
and behavior by condition (i.e., threat, neutral, or ambiguous) for children with high and 
low IU, a mean split of IUS-C scores was used to create two groups. 23 children with an 
IUS-C score of 57 or below were coded as low IU and 24 children with an IUS-C score 
of 58 or above were coded as high IU. Children in these groups did not differ by age, 
t(45) = 0.47, p = .64, or gender, X2 (1, N = 47) = 1.02, p = .31. A repeated measures 
mixed ANCOVA predicting RT from condition was not significant for the high, F(2, 68) 
= 0.21, p = .81, or low IU groups, F(2, 65) = 0.078, p = .93. A repeated measures mixed 
ANCOVA predicting target dwell duration by condition yielded a main effect of 
condition in the high, F(2, 62) = 4.17, p = .022, but not low IU group, F(2, 56) = 0.50, p 
= .61. Children in the high IU group were significantly more likely to attend to distractors 
during the ambiguous condition as compared to the neutral condition, p = .026. The 
difference between dwell duration in the ambiguous as compared to threat condition 
approached but did not reach statistical significance, p = .080. Estimated marginal means 
are presented in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of dwell duration proportion predicted by condition for 
high and low IU groups. 
Note. *p < .05 
Hypothesis 3: IU predicts anxiety symptoms, moderated by attentional and 
emotional control. Bivariate correlations conducted between IUS-C scores, anxiety 
symptom scores, BRIEF subscales, and covariates are displayed in Table 3. IUS-C was 
related to BAI-Y T-score, r(47) = .71, p < .001, and PSWQ-C score, r(47) = .66, p < 
.001. Hierarchical linear regressions indicated that IUS-C significantly predicted BAI-Y 
explained a significant proportion of variance in BAI-Y, R2 = .51, F(1,45) = 46.00, p < 
.001. When controlling for gender differences, IUS-C significantly predicted PSWQ-C, β 
= .65, p < .001, and explained a significant proportion of variance in PSWQ-C, R2 = .43, 
F(2,44) = 16.70, p < .001.  
Moderational models were tested predicting anxiety symptoms from IUS-C with 
BRIEF subscales as moderators, with gender as a covariate. Shift, R2 = .0023, F(1, 42) 
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= 0.19, p = .67, and EC, R2 = .028, F(1, 42) = 2.41, p = .13, failed to moderate the 
relation between IUS-C and BAI-Y T-score. Shift, R2 = .0036, F(1, 42) = 0.41, p = .52, 
and EC, R2 = .0002, F(1, 42) = 0.016, p = .90, also failed to moderate the relation 
between IUS-C and PSWQ-C.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 Anxiety disorder symptoms. Given the significant relation between IUS-C and 
anxiety symptoms found in the current sample and in past studies (Osmanagaoglu et al., 
2017),  the relation between task outcome variables and anxiety symptoms was explored. 
Bivariate correlations conducted between BAI-Y T-scores, PSWQ-C scores, covariates, 
and task outcome variables are displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Correlation Coefficients between Anxiety Symptom Measures, Task Outcomes, and Covariates 
Anxiety symptoms Behavior Attention Covariates 
BAI-Y-T PSWQ-C Accuracy RT Target 
dwell 
Threat 
dwell 
Neutral 
dwell 
Age Gender 
BAI-Y-T 
PSWQ-C .66** 
Accuracy -.03 .08 
RT .20 .44** .02 
Target dwell -.23 -.27 .03 .08 
Threat dwell .03 .29 -.06 .04 -.84**  
Neutral dwell .26 .22 -.09 -.17 -.85** .58** 
Age -.02 .05 .24 -.25 -.12 .07 .10 
Gender .24 .35* .31 .31* .15 -.17 -.10 -.16 
Note. BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; RT = Overall average RT 
*p < .05, ** p < .01
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PSWQ-C was related to average overall RT, r(47) = .44, p = .002. BAI-Y was not 
related to any task outcome variables. A hierarchical linear regression indicated that, 
when controlling for gender differences, PSWQ-C significantly predicted RT, R2 = .22, 
F(2,44) = 6.14, β = .38, p = .011. 
A 2 (diagnostic group) x 3 (condition) repeated measures mixed ANCOVA 
yielded a main effect of diagnostic group, F(1, 141) = 12.97, p < .001, but not condition, 
F(2, 141) = 0.12, p = .89, on RT. The anxious group demonstrated significantly slower 
RTs across conditions as compared to the non-anxious group, p < .001. A 2 (diagnostic 
group) x 3 (condition) repeated measures mixed ANCOVA did not indicate a main effect 
for diagnostic group, F(1, 126) = 0.21, p = .65, or condition, F(2, 126) = 1.10, p = .34, on 
target dwell duration. 
Correlations between IUS-C and task outcome variables were also investigated in 
the anxious and non-anxious groups separately. Pearson’s r values are displayed in Table 
5.  
Table 5. Correlations Coefficients between IUS-C and Task Outcomes by Group 
IUS-C 
Anxious Non-anxious 
Target dwell -.17 -.52* 
Threat dwell .15 .30 
Neutral dwell .04 .44* 
Reaction time .35 -.02 
Note. *p < .05 
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In the non-anxious group only IUS-C predicted target dwell duration, r(22) = -.52, 
p = .017, and dwell duration on neutral distractors, r(22) = .44, p = .017. No task 
variables were related to IUS-C in the anxious group. 
Reaction time variability. Previous research has indicated that greater RT 
variability is associated with less effective cognitive control (Ode, Robinson, & Hanson, 
2011), including lapses in on-task attention (Vaurio, Simmonds, & Mostofsky, 2009), and 
less efficient information processing (Karalunas & Huang-Pollock, 2013). Because 
higher IUS-C score predicted increased distraction during the task, the relation between 
IUS-C score and RT variability was explored. Ex-Gaussian models were fit to each 
child’s RT distribution using the ‘retimes’ package in R statistical software (Massidda, 
2013). Tau (τ), a measure of variability due to increases in the distribution tail, was 
examined (Whelan, 2008). Increases in τ indicate longer infrequent RTs rather than 
overall slowed processing speed (Balota & Yap, 2011). IUS-C score significantly 
predicted τ, R2 = .09, F(1, 45) = 4.68, p = .036, β = .31. RT distributions for high and low 
IU groups are displayed in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Reaction time distributions by IU group. 
Fixation duration skewness. Skewness of fixation duration distributions is 
related to individual differences in task processing, where greater positive skewness 
indicates decreased cognitive control ability (Henderson, Choi, Luke, & Schmidt, 2018) 
and less effortful cognitive processing of a scene (Luke & Henderson, 2016), and lesser 
positive skewness indicates goal-oriented scene viewing (Hartwig, Schnitzspahn, Kliegel, 
Velichkovsky, & Helmert, 2013). Because IUS-C and anxiety symptoms in the current 
sample were related to cognitive control measures, IUS-C and anxiety symptoms were 
examined in relation to the skewness value of each participant’s fixation duration 
distribution. To control for multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni corrected alpha value of 
.017 (critical α level = .05/3 = .017) was used. PSWQ-C significantly predicted skew, 
R2 = .16, F(1, 40) = 7.02, p = .012, β = .40, such that higher PSWQ-C score predicted an 
increase in the number of short fixations, but IUS-C, p = .53, and BAI-Y, p = .64, did not. 
Fixation duration distributions for high and low worry groups are displayed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Fixation duration distribution for high and low worry groups. 
IU and attention over time. To further explore information processing 
differences, dwell duration was separated into two time bins representing the first and 
second half of the task. Dwell duration proportion on target was calculated for each 
condition (i.e., ambiguous, threat, and neutral). A 2 (IU group) x 2 (time) repeated 
measures mixed ANCOVA predicting dwell duration proportion for ambiguous 
conditions yielded a significant interaction between IU group and time, F(1, 84) = 4.053, 
p = .047. Pairwise comparisons revealed that this interaction was driven by a significant 
difference in dwell during the first half of the task. The high IU group spent significantly 
more time attending to distractors in ambiguous conditions during the first half of the task 
as compared to the low IU group, F(1, 84) = 16.61, p < .001. The IU groups did not 
significantly differ in the second half of the task, p = .074. No significant main or 
interaction effects were identified when predicting dwell duration proportion during 
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neutral or threat conditions, ps > .084. Estimated marginal means for dwell duration 
proportion in ambiguous conditions are presented in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Graphical representation of dwell duration proportion in ambiguous conditions 
predicted by IU group by time.  
Note. *p < .05 
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DISCUSSION 
 The current study examined the relation between IU and behavioral and cognitive 
aspects of decision-making among children with and without anxiety disorders. IU is a 
transdiagnostic, trait-like risk factor for the development of psychopathology and 
interventions that target IU have shown promise in effectively reducing disorder 
symptoms among those with emotional disorders and comorbid conditions. While it is 
well established that IU predicts a range of disorder symptoms, it is unclear what 
mechanisms drive this relation. This is likely due, in part, to the paucity of research 
examining correlates of IU at behavioral and physiological levels of analysis. Even fewer 
studies examining these aspects of IU in childhood exist, limiting our knowledge of the 
impact of IU on the development of cognitive and emotional processing differences that 
underlie emotional disorders (e.g., weaker attentional control, emotional dysregulation, 
etc.).  
The aim of the current study was to begin addressing these gaps by examining 
how children with higher IU resolve uncertainty. The study hypothesized that IU is 
associated with individual differences in decision-making that may contribute to the 
development of psychopathology. Specifically, it was hypothesized that children with 
higher IU would exhibit increased evaluation of available information, delays in decision-
making, and reduced accuracy, and that these differences would be greater in the 
presence of ambiguous information. It was also expected that IU would predict greater 
deficits in the aspects of higher-order cognitive control that support decision-making 
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under uncertainty, namely emotional and attentional control, and these differences would 
moderate the relation between IU and disorder symptoms.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses revealed that the current sample exhibited somewhat higher 
rates of GAD than expected within the anxiety disorder group. Previous epidemiological 
studies indicate that specific phobias, separation anxiety, and social anxiety are the most 
prevalent anxiety disorders diagnosed prior to age 14 (Merikangas et al., 2011), however, 
others indicate that GAD may be the most prevalent childhood anxiety disorder, followed 
by separation and panic disorders (Copeland, Angold, Shanahan, & Costello, 2014). 
Increased prevalence of GAD in the current sample is likely due to recruitment 
procedures. Recruitment for the present study focused on identifying children with 
chronic and impairing worry, rather than anxiety broadly, as the present study was 
interested in recruiting children with a range of IU levels and IU exhibits a particularly 
strong association with worry, as compared to physiological or behavioral symptoms of 
anxiety (Donovan, Holmes, Farrell, & Hearn, 2017).  Some evidence exists for the 
separation of child anxiety disorders into distress (i.e., GAD) and fear (i.e., specific 
phobias, separation anxiety disorder, and social anxiety disorder) disorders based on 
findings that children with distress disorders exhibit hypervigilance towards threat, while 
children with fear disorders show attentional avoidance of threat (A. M. Waters, Bradley, 
& Mogg, 2014). This is also consistent with the finding of increased attention to 
threatening distractors in the current study’s sample. Results of the current study may be 
limited in their generalizability to fear disorders based on the sample characteristics.  
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Preliminary analyses also revealed several gender differences in the current 
sample. Girls were more likely to meet criteria for an anxiety disorder. This is consistent 
with past examinations of gender differences among childhood anxiety disorders 
(Broeren, Muris, Diamantopoulou, & Baker, 2013; Crocetti, Klimstra, Keijsers, Hale, & 
Meeus, 2009). It is unclear why gender differences in childhood anxiety disorder 
prevalence exist, though it has been theorized that emotion socialization and other 
relevant parenting factors play a role (Zahn-Waxler, Shirtcliff, & Marceau, 2008). Of 
note, gender differences have not been identified for the age of onset or chronicity of 
anxiety disorders in past studies (Mclean, Asnaani, Litz, & G, 2011). Girls in the current 
sample also exhibited significantly higher levels of negative affect. Previous studies have 
not identified gender differences in negative affect (Hirshfeld-Becker et al., 2008), but it 
has been suggested that girls and boys with high negative affect may experience 
differential emotion socialization parenting practices that contribute to differences in the 
development of anxiety disorder symptoms (Brumariu & Kerns, 2015). Girls in the 
current sample also exhibited significantly greater difficulties with attentional control. 
Small gender differences in attentional control have been identified in the opposite 
direction in previous studies, with boys having relatively greater attentional control 
difficulties than girls (Huizinga & Smidts, 2011).  
Gender differences in negative affect and attentional control in the current study 
are likely due to the gender differences in anxiety disorder rates. Gender was held as a 
covariate throughout hypothesis testing to account for these differences. Given the 
possible differences in parenting that interact with gender to predict disorder symptoms, 
it is possible that parenting interacts with gender in the relation between IU and disorder 
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symptoms as well. That is, emotional socialization of girls with high IU may impact the 
pathway between uncertainty processing and the development of an anxiety disorder 
differently than the emotional socialization of boys with high IU. Examining parenting 
and gender in future studies of childhood IU may further explain the relation between this 
risk factor and disorder symptoms.  
 Age was not associated with any study variables, as expected, given the narrow 
age range used in this study. While inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility improve 
throughout childhood (Diamond, 2014) and, specifically, BRIEF Shift and Emotional 
Control scores decrease significantly, this tends to occur over a broader age range (i.e., 
from ages 5 to 14; Huizinga & Smidts, 2011). The nonsignificant relation found here may 
indicate that a relatively restricted age range was used. Most participants in the current 
sample fell between the ages of 8 and 12. Identifying significant changes in emotional 
and attentional control may require the use of a broader age range. It is also possible that 
the impact of age on the executive function domains investigated here have small effect 
sizes that could not be detected by the current study’s sample size.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Behavior and IU during decision-making. Behavior in the present study was 
operationalized as RT and accuracy on Go trials during the study task. With regard to 
behavior, the current study hypothesized that higher IU would be related to slower RTs 
and reduced accuracy. This hypothesis was partially supported. Increases in IU 
significantly predicted increases in RTs but not reductions in accuracy. The 
nonsignificant relation between accuracy and IU was likely due to the restricted range of 
errors on the study task. Of the 47 children who completed the task, 36 did not make any 
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errors and the greatest number of errors made was 3 (i.e., 92% correct responses). This 
was likely due to the relatively slow pace of the study task. Previous studies examining 
accuracy and anxiety symptoms in children have reported similar issues and ultimately 
omitted accuracy from study analyses (Brown et al., 2014). Thus, accuracy was omitted 
from further analysis in the current study.  
Past studies indicate that the presence of uncertainty engages bottom-up 
emotional arousal and top-down cognitive control to facilitate decision-making. Increases 
in uncertainty during experimental decision-making paradigms are associated with 
slowed RTs across individuals, as uncertainty signals the need for controlled cognitive 
processing rather than automatic responding (Fan et al., 2014). The degree to which an 
individual adapts to increases in uncertainty and resumes efficient responding (i.e., 
decreased RT) following changes in uncertainty depends, in part, on the individual’s 
physiological responsiveness to environmental cues (de Berker et al., 2016). 
Physiological responses that accurately track uncertainty facilitate effective learning 
processes, which allow for reductions in future uncertainty (FeldmanHall et al., 2016).   
Individual differences in emotional and cognitive control responsiveness to 
uncertainty may predict individual differences in decision-making under uncertainty, 
including behavioral aspects of decision-making, such as RT. One study found that the 
relation between inhibitory control and RT during a decision-making task was attenuated 
by cue ambiguity, such that weaker inhibitory control predicted slower RTs only when 
decision-making cues were ambiguous (Kalanthroff, Linkovski, Henik, Wheaton, & 
Anholt, 2016). Another study found that increases in uncertainty predicted increases in 
cognitive control, and, among youth specifically, IU predicted the magnitude of these 
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increases. Youth with higher IU demonstrated increasing reactivity, rather than adaptive 
responsiveness, as uncertainty increased (Krain et al., 2006). Further, increases in IU are 
associated with diminished sensitivity of learning rates to outcome volatility during 
decision-making (Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O’Reilly, & Bishop, 2015). In the present 
study, higher IU may predict slowed RT because children with higher IU are more 
emotionally reactive to uncertainty and less able to engage cognitive control processes 
that are responsive to task demands during decision-making, contributing to difficulty 
creating efficient response strategies during the task.  
The current study also hypothesized that children with higher IU would exhibit 
behavioral differences under different threat conditions. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that children with high IU would demonstrate significantly slower RTs for ambiguously 
threatening, as compared to neutral and overtly threatening, conditions. This hypothesis 
was not supported; children with high IU did not demonstrate differences in RT by 
condition. While increased uncertainty slows RTs, past studies indicate that this 
phenomenon is present regardless of the threat valence of uncertain cues (Speed, Jackson, 
Nelson, Infantolino, & Hajcak, 2017). In the present study, individual differences in RT 
may not have been affected by uncertainty arising from the threat valence of cues (i.e., 
the presence of threatening and neutral distractors), but from the uncertain probability of 
seeing a Go cue (i.e., 50%), which remained stable throughout the task. 
To further explore the relation between IU and behavior, RT variability was 
examined. Given the hypothesized relation between IU and attention, and the relation 
between attention and RT variability in past studies (e.g., Antonini, Narad, Landberg, & 
Epstein, 2013), the current study hypothesized that a significant positive relation would 
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exist between IU and RT variability. The data supported this hypothesis. Higher IU 
predicted greater τ, indicating that the slower average RTs identified among children with 
higher IU are due in part to increases in the RTs of the slowest, least frequent responses.  
No studies have examined IU and RT variability, however, past studies indicate 
that increases in τ are related to differences in attentional and emotional control (Sjöwall, 
Roth, Lindqvist, & Thorell, 2013). τ is highly related to on-task behavior and successful 
on-task attention among typically developing children (Antonini et al., 2013). The speed 
of stimuli presented during a task also moderates the relation between τ and on-task 
behavior, such that τ is a better indicator of inattention when stimuli are presented at a 
relatively slower speed (Antonini et al., 2013), such as in the present study. Among 
adults, RT variability, corrected for overall average RT speed, is associated with less 
effective cognitive control and increases in negative emotion in daily life. Further, those 
with higher RT variability report experiencing more adverse effects related to attentional 
lapses in daily life (Ode et al., 2011). In the present study, the relation between IU and 
RT may be driven by RT variability rather than overall slowed processing speed. 
Children with higher IU may experience difficulty sustaining top-down goal directed 
attention through the duration of the task, leading to periodic attentional lapses that yield 
a small number of significantly slower responses, which ultimately increase their overall 
average RT.  
Behavior and anxiety symptoms during decision-making. Exploratory 
analyses indicated that worry and anxiety symptoms exhibited a similar relation to RT as 
that identified between RT and IU. Worry and anxiety symptoms predicted slower RTs, 
and children with anxiety disorders did not demonstrate differences in RT by condition. 
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Current literature regarding anxiety and RT remains extremely mixed, though some 
studies suggest that slowed RTs only arise among anxious individuals in the presence of 
threatening distractors, as the presence of threat increases anxiety, which interferes with 
cognitive control (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). As mentioned previously, studies of 
anxious children have yielded weak effect sizes when predicting RT from anxiety 
symptoms (Brown et al., 2014). One study found that attentional control and RT during a 
go/no-go task was associated with intolerance of distress independent of actual distress 
symptoms (i.e., anxiety and depressive symptoms; Macatee et al., 2018). Past studies 
have also not identified a relation between RT variability and anxiety (Antonini et al., 
2013; Krain et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2015). 
Because past literature does not indicate that anxiety impacts RT, individual 
differences in RT in the present study may be primarily due to IU rather than anxiety. 
Further, past literature indicates that if differences in RT were driven by anxiety 
symptoms, RTs would be slowed in the presence of threatening distractors. Anxious 
children in the present study did not exhibit RT differences based on threat condition. 
Attention and IU during decision-making. Attention in the present study was 
operationalized as the proportion of time spent looking at areas of interest during the task 
(i.e., dwell duration). With regard to attention, the current study hypothesized that higher 
IU would be related to greater distraction during the task. This hypothesis was supported; 
increases in IU predicted decreases in attention to the target and increases in attention to 
threatening distractors. In the non-anxious group specifically, increases in IU predicted 
increases in attention to neutral distractors.  
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The current study also hypothesized that children with higher IU would exhibit 
attentional differences under different threat conditions; specifically, that children with 
high IU would demonstrate significantly greater distraction from the target during 
ambiguously threatening, as compared to neutral and overtly threatening, conditions. This 
hypothesis was supported, with children in the high IU group demonstrating significantly 
less attention to the target under ambiguous conditions as compared to neutral conditions. 
Attention to the target during ambiguous compared to threatening conditions trended 
toward, but did not reach, significance among children with high IU, and no significant 
differences were identified between attention to the target in threatening compared to 
neutral conditions for children with high IU.  
The relation between attention and threat condition was also examined over time. 
It was hypothesized that children with high IU would be more distracted from the target 
during the first half of the task as compared to children with low IU. This hypothesis was 
supported for ambiguous conditions only. During ambiguously threatening trials, children 
with high IU were more distracted than children with low IU in the first half of the task, 
but not the second half of the task. There was no effect of time on attention between high 
and low IU groups for threatening or neutral conditions.   
The learned predictiveness and learned value of information modulates both 
controlled and automatic visual attention (Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 
2016). Healthy individuals suppress attention to areas of visual scenes known to have a 
high likelihood of containing distractors during decision-making so that the target can be 
identified and attended to efficiently (Wang & Theeuwes, 2018a). Attentional 
suppression of distractors occurs when the decision-maker accurately tracks the 
62 
probabilities of distractors appearing across the visual scene and uses this statistical map 
to identify locations most likely to contain distractors (Wang & Theeuwes, 2018b). Faster 
RTs are associated with this type of distractor identification, while slower RTs are 
associated with top-down identification of distractors based on representations stored in 
working memory (Gaspar & McDonald, 2014).  
Evidence of slower RTs and greater distraction together in the current study may 
indicate that children with high IU are more reliant on stored representations of 
distractors to identify and suppress attention to these stimuli. Because IU is associated 
with difficulties learning the causal statistics of an environment, children with high IU in 
the current study may have been less able to rely on probability based attentional 
suppression and therefore more reliant on stored knowledge of visual cues. Increased 
attention toward a stimulus is associated with increased fixation and dwell duration on 
the stimulus (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). Visual stimuli matching stimuli stored in 
visual working memory automatically capture attention, however, this effect can be 
overcome by top-down attentional control (Kiss, Grubert, Petersen, & Eimer, 2012; 
Sawaki & Luck, 2011). Thus, increased dwell duration on distractors in the current study 
may indicate reliance on working memory representations of distractors coupled with 
weak attentional control.  
Healthy individuals update prior representations of visual scenes with current 
information during repeated decision-making to accumulate knowledge and continually 
hone response strategies over time (Behrens et al., 2007). Stimuli salience directs early 
visual attention (Egeth, Leonard, & Leber, 2011), and motivationally salient stimuli (i.e., 
stimuli that signal reward or punishment) capture early visual attention even when the 
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stimuli are not physically salient or task-relevant (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & 
Beesley, 2015; Nissens, Failing, & Theeuwes, 2017). As a task progresses, attentional 
selectivity, through cognitive control and accumulated knowledge of the scene, allows for 
a reduction in vulnerability to distraction (Theeuwes, 2010). 
Children with higher IU may be particularly distracted by ambiguous information 
because it is more salient to them. Individuals with higher IU experience errors as more 
aversive, and, accordingly, more motivationally salient (Jackson, Nelson, & Hajcak, 
2016). Ambiguous information may be particularly salient to children with higher IU 
during early task trials because it serves as a cue for potential errors, and this 
motivational salience may interfere with information processing based on the task 
demands. Specifically, it may interfere with the process of identifying distractors as such. 
Children with higher IU may take longer to create representations of ambiguous 
environments because they have difficulty learning the value of information (i.e., whether 
a stimulus is integral or irrelevant to the task goal) so that distractors can be identified, 
and have more difficulty learning the statistical regularities of ambiguous environments 
so that attention to the identified distractors can be suppressed.  
Attention and anxiety symptoms during decision-making. Exploratory 
analyses indicated that anxiety and worry were not related to greater distraction in the 
current sample. This is consistent with current literature concerning anxiety and attention 
among youth. Past studies have identified a robust attentional bias toward threat among 
children with anxiety disorders (Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). However, this bias is only 
identified during early attentional orienting (e.g., time to initial fixation) and has not been 
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identified during sustained attentional processes (e.g., dwell duration; Shechner et al., 
2013). 
Exploratory analyses also indicated that worry, but not IU or anxiety, was related 
to fixation duration skewness, such that children who reported higher levels of worry 
exhibited a greater number of short fixations during the study task. While research 
concerning individual differences in fixation duration distribution is limited, evidence 
from eye-tracking studies of both scene viewing and reading suggests that greater fixation 
durations are under cognitive control, while shorter fixation durations are not (Henderson 
et al., 2018; Kardan et al., 2015; Luke & Henderson, 2016). Evidence from eye-tracking 
studies of student attention and learning outcomes also indicates that increases in fixation 
duration skew are associated with mind wandering, where individuals begin to exhibit a 
greater number of shorter fixations just prior to an episode of off-task mind wandering 
(Hutt, Mills, White, Donnelly, & D’Mello, 2016). Further, investigations of the 
functional connectivity differences between worry and anxiety indicate that, while 
anxiety is associated with impoverished attentional control, worry is uniquely related to 
differences in Default Mode functioning, the network of brain areas associated with off-
task, self-referential thought, and specifically to mind-wandering (Forster, Elizalde, 
Castle, & Bishop, 2015). While conclusions about this finding are preliminary, it is 
possible that the association between fixation duration skewness and worry may indicate 
that children who were distracted by their worries during the task exhibited gaze 
distributions similar to those associated with mind wandering.  
IU, cognitive control, and anxiety symptoms. It was hypothesized that children 
with higher IU would have greater cognitive control difficulties and increased anxiety 
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symptoms, and that cognitive control would moderate the relation between IU and 
anxiety symptoms. The first two of these hypotheses were supported; children in the 
current study who reported greater IU were rated by their parents as having greater 
difficulties with attentional and emotional control in daily life, and children who reported 
greater IU also reported increased worry and anxiety. The third hypothesis was not 
supported; attentional and emotional control did not moderate the relation between  
Cognitive and neuroimaging literature provides evidence for the role of brain 
areas associated with emotional and attentional control in decision-making under 
uncertainty (Mushtaq et al., 2011). The ability to use emotion as information (Marroquin, 
Boyle, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Stanton, 2016) and deploy adequate attention to incoming, 
task-relevant information (Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017) supports learning under 
uncertainty (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016). Brain areas associated 
with the processing and regulation of somatic-emotional cues are associated with 
subjective perceptions of uncertainty specifically (Stern, Gonzalez, Welsh, & Taylor, 
2010). Difficulties with attentional and emotional control may contribute to increased 
perceptions of uncertainty and difficulty resolving uncertainty, which drive the aversive 
reactions to and negative beliefs about uncertainty that underlie IU (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013). 
IU in the current study was associated with individual differences in decision-
making processes under uncertainty. The differences in behavior and attention identified 
among children with higher IU in the current study may arise because these children have 
difficulty with higher order attentional and emotional control. Specifically, difficulty 
regulating the emotional reactions elicited by uncertainty may diminish the use of 
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emotions as information in decision-making and increase perceptions of uncertainty, 
reciprocally increasing emotional reactivity (Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016). 
Biased uncertainty calculations coupled with weaker attentional control may interfere 
with the ability to update learning rates according to task demands, allow for lapses in on-
task attention toward task-irrelevant information, and ultimately result in inefficient 
decision-making behaviors.  
The relation between IU and anxiety symptoms among youth is a robust finding 
(Osmanagaoglu et al., 2017) that was replicated in the current study. Cognitive control 
did not moderate this relation. Previous studies have established that childhood anxiety 
disorders are characterized by deficits in emotion regulation (Bender, Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Esbjørn, & Pons, 2012; Carthy, Horesh, Apter, & Gross, 2010) and attentional control 
(Kertz, Belden, Tillman, & Luby, 2016; Lau & Waters, 2017). It is possible that 
attentional and emotional control play a mediational role in the relation between IU and 
anxiety, where IU predicts anxiety symptoms because it is associated with emotional and 
attentional weaknesses, however, the current study’s cross-sectional design precludes 
testing this hypothesis.    
Implications for the Impact of IU on Development and Anxiety Symptoms 
Results of the current study have implications for models of IU across 
development. Past studies show that the cognitive and emotional processing of 
uncertainty is separable from the processing of threat (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). IU 
likely arises from individual differences in uncertainty processing specifically, which 
contribute to distress in the presence of uncertainty even in the absence of threat 
(Pepperdine, Lomax, & Freeston, 2018). In non-threatening, uncertain environments 
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individuals with anxiety disorders have difficulty determining whether an unexpected 
outcome is due to a true change in the likelihood of a cue-outcome relationship or 
whether it represents statistical randomness (Huang, Thompson, & Paulus, 2017). As a 
result, they tend to adjust learning rates based on irrelevant outcomes and have difficulty 
creating accurate representations of uncertain environments, contributing to uncertainty 
about uncertainty (Bach, Hulme, Penny, & Dolan, 2011). During decision-making, these 
adults tend to avoid information-poor options (Bishop & Gagne, 2018) and reduce time 
spent evaluating options under uncertainty (Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011), 
indicating that IU may be related to avoidance of uncertainty.   
If IU is related to uncertainty avoidance, IU in childhood may interfere with the 
development of uncertainty processing skills by restricting children’s opportunities to 
identify and resolve uncertainty. Children with high IU in the current study spent more 
time evaluating available information and were particularly likely to attend to ambiguous 
information. Higher IU among children without an anxiety disorder was also associated 
with attentional differences in the present study. It is possible that over-processing of 
ambiguous and task-irrelevant information among children with higher IU represents 
avoidance of uncertainty. Greater emotional reactivity and difficulty with emotional 
control associated with IU may increase subjective perceptions of uncertainty regardless 
of the true availability of information. Further, uncertainty about uncertainty, or under-
confidence about statistical estimates and value judgements, increases the tendency to 
rely on short-term information, despite environmental stability. This delays the 
accumulation of relevant knowledge and allows for continued attention to irrelevant 
information, which increases the subjective perception of uncertainty and prevents 
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efficient decision-making (Bishop & Gagne, 2018). Children with higher IU may spend 
more time attending to ambiguous information because they require more information to 
sufficiently reduce perceived uncertainty. Over time, inefficient processing of and 
reactivity to uncertainty may contribute to top-down representations of uncertainty as 
aversive, and lead to adult IU patterns of uncertainty avoidance.  
Results of the current study may also have implications for models of IU as a risk 
factor for anxiety disorder symptoms. While IU may contribute to difficulty processing 
ambiguous stimuli generally, exposure to a threatening learning experience (e.g., a 
significant life stressor, anxious parenting, etc.) may create a specific difficulty 
determining the valence of ambiguous information (i.e.., categorizing ambiguous stimuli 
as threatening or neutral). Children who have difficulty accurately categorizing stimuli 
fail to learn to inhibit fear responses to ambiguous stimuli over the course of development 
(Lau et al., 2011). The inefficient processing of uncertainty associated with IU may also 
contribute to inaccurate predictions of the likelihood of future threat and prevent flexible 
updating of threat representations based on new information. One study has shown that 
increased predictability attenuates startle reactions to threat, while unpredictability 
increases startle reactions among children with anxiety disorders, supporting the 
hypothesis that an interaction between uncertainty processing and threat processing exists 
among those with anxiety disorders (Nelson & Hajcak, 2017). Together, the over-
generalization of fear responses to ambiguity, biased calculations of threat outcomes 
under uncertainty, and rigid responding to perceived threat cues may contribute to the 
development of an anxiety disorder.  
69 
Limitations of the Current Study 
The current study has several limitations which require consideration. First, the 
cross-sectional nature of this study prevents drawing causal conclusions about the results. 
While the results were considered in the context of developmental models of emotional 
and cognitive control and developmental psychopathology, longitudinal investigations of 
IU will be required to establish causation between the outcomes examined. Specifically, 
it is unclear whether IU contributes to weaknesses in executive functioning or if 
executive functioning deficits contribute to IU. Longitudinal studies will be particularly 
important in determining how IU and early temperamental risk factors, such as 
behavioral inhibition and negative affect, relate. Given the nonsignificant relation 
between age and other variables in the current study, a broader age range may also be 
useful in determining how IU impacts the development of uncertainty across childhood 
and into adulthood.  
Second, while the current study focused on two aspects of executive functioning 
(i.e., emotional and attentional control) there are other relevant functions involved in 
uncertainty processing that warrant consideration in the study of IU. Working memory is 
a key aspect of executive function associated with decision-making under uncertainty 
(Cui et al., 2015). Deficits in working memory ability have been implicated in the 
development of psychopathology broadly (Huang-Pollock, Shapiro, Galloway-Long, & 
Weigard, 2017; Vytal, Arkin, Overstreet, Lieberman, & Grillon, 2016) and anxiety 
disorders specifically (Bishop, 2009). In the current study, distractors in the ambiguous 
condition may have represented higher working memory load, as the scene contained two 
different distractors rather than two of the same image. While executive functions are 
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separable constructs, deficits in one area are often related to deficits in others (Chevalier, 
2015), and it is possible that the attentional and emotional control difficulties identified 
among children with high IU in the current study represent difficulties with executive 
functioning more broadly, or are related to a different specific executive function 
difficulty, such as working memory.  
 Third, the study task relied on distractors that represented both threat ambiguity 
and statistical uncertainty. This may limit the ability to draw conclusions about the 
relation between IU and uncertainty or threat processing individually. As anxiety disorder 
development likely results from differences in both uncertainty and threat processing, it 
will be important for future studies to vary the degree of uncertainty and threat within the 
experimental paradigm independently to examine how differences in each pathway 
contribute to anxiety disorders. For example, examining differences in physiological 
(e.g., pupil dilation, startle-blink, skin conductance) and behavioral (e.g., avoidance, 
perseveration, distractibility) responses to a cue that signals an aversive outcome in low 
uncertainty, high uncertainty, and volatile conditions, holding the objective aversiveness 
of the outcome constant, and comparing this to responses when the cue-outcome statistics 
are stable but the aversiveness varies.  
 Finally, the current study drew conclusions about attention from measures of eye-
gaze, which are related to overt, behavioral aspects of attention, but not necessarily covert 
attention (Gibb et al., 2016). While these measures can provide important information 
about what and how children attend to visual scenes, they do not capture the full range of 
attentional processes. Most studies examining biased attention in anxiety disorders 
employ dot-probe paradigms to examine differences in covert attention to threat (Kruijt, 
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Field, & Fox, 2016). However, these studies are limited in the conclusions that can be 
made about attentional differences over time and in naturalistic settings (Gamble & 
Rapee, 2009). Examinations of attentional differences in IU may be strengthened by the 
use of paradigms that engage overt and covert attention independently, such as gaze-
contingent masking (Hermans & De Houwer, 2010). 
Summary and Future Directions 
IU is associated with increased attention toward off-task distractors and increased 
RT during decision-making due to greater variability in responding. Children with higher 
IU are particularly distracted by ambiguously threatening stimuli and take longer to 
suppress attention to distractors in ambiguous conditions than children with lower IU. 
The relation between IU and distraction is present among both children with and without 
anxiety disorders. The current study is one of the first to examine the relation between 
childhood IU and attention and behavior under uncertainty. Children with higher IU are 
more likely to engage in over-processing of ambiguous stimuli and experience off-task 
attentional lapses during decision-making. In real world situations, children with higher 
IU may spend more time considering irrelevant information when attempting to make a 
decision and may be particularly likely to engage in this behavior when they are less 
certain about a decision, have less experience with the decision they are making, or are 
underconfident about their ability to make an adequate decision. They may become easily 
distracted by unimportant details and subsequently delay decision-making because their 
subjective uncertainty remains high due to time spent processing extraneous information 
that does not reduce true levels of uncertainty. These decision-making difficulties may 
ultimately contribute to beliefs that uncertainty is unfair and avoidance of decision-
72 
making through adherence to rigid patterns of behavior and distress when confronted 
with unexpected change.  
IU has been consistently identified as a risk factor for the development of anxiety 
disorders, but research concerning attentional patterns among youth with and at risk for 
these disorders has yielded conflicting results. A large body of literature indicates that 
anxiety, in clinical and community samples, is associated with attentional bias toward 
threat (Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). This finding is based primarily on studies of 
attentional orienting, however, and studies examining sustained attention indicate that 
anxiety is associated with attentional avoidance of threat (Sonuga-Barke, Cortese, 
Fairchild, & Stringaris, 2016). Future studies should seek to examine multiple aspects of 
attention, namely sustained attention, attentional orienting, and executive attention, in 
both threatening and uncertain environments to inform models of information processing 
biases associated with the development of anxiety disorders.  
Mixed findings are likely also due to the inclusion of clinically and sub-clinically 
anxious children in these studies. Children at risk for developing anxiety disorders do not 
show the same information processing biases as children with anxiety disorders in past 
studies (Ewing et al., 2016). In the present study, IU was associated with increased 
distractibility to neutral distractors only among children without anxiety disorders. It is 
possible that information processing among children at risk for developing an anxiety 
disorder is not representative of information processing biases among clinically anxious 
youth. The current study posits that IU represents individual differences in uncertainty 
processing that interact with aberrant threat processing to give rise to anxiety disorders. 
Thus, future studies should seek to differentiate attention and behavior associated with IU 
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from that associated with chronic anxiety by examining children with anxiety disorders, 
children at-risk for anxiety disorders, and typically developing children.  
The current study also identified a relation between worry, but not IU or anxiety, 
and fixation duration skewness. Increases in fixation duration skewness precede episodes 
of mind-wandering, and worry is associated with increased functional connectivity 
between brain areas associated with decision-making and those associated with mind-
wandering. The finding in the current study was exploratory, however, fixation duration 
distribution may serve as an indicator of worry. Further, as IU is typically a robust 
predictor of worry, the nonsignificant relation between IU and fixation duration 
distribution may suggest that this skewness reflects a cognitive vulnerability for worry 
independent from maladaptive uncertainty processing. Future studies should seek to 
investigate the relation between risk factors for anxiety disorders, including IU and 
worry, in relation to multiple characteristics of eye-gaze, including distribution and 
frequency.  
Finally, future studies should investigate whether IU can be targeted prior to the 
development of a psychological disorder as a preventative intervention. The current 
results suggest that IU among both anxious and non-anxious children contributes to 
attentional and behavioral differences during decision-making. Use of measures such as 
the IUSC could help identify children who are at-risk for developing the disorders 
associated with IU. Because IU is associated with a broad range of disorders, the IUSC 
may be a more efficient predictor of future difficulties, rather than screening for the 
presence of each disorder symptom separately. Interventions could target decision-
making difficulties broadly, including prolonged perseveration on ambiguous 
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information, difficulty identifying and using the emotional valence of information in 
decision-making, inaccurate probability estimation of outcomes, and emotion 
dysregulation specifically related to incorrect choices. Future studies should examine the 
utility of measures such as the IUSC for identifying children who later develop 
psychological disorders, and the usefulness of treatments that target behaviors related to 
IU. In settings where children are more likely to experience threatening events that could 
interact with IU to produce disorder symptoms (e.g., chronically ill children in pediatric 
settings), the IUSC may serve as a useful tool for identifying vulnerable children.  
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Solving, Defiant Child, Organization Skills Training, and behavior management
 Led the Managing Frustration for Children (MFC) group, a manualized treatment
designed for children ages 8-11 with emotion regulation and related behavioral
difficulties; led the MFC parenting group, a manualized companion treatment for
parents of children with ADHD and related emotional difficulties
 Met weekly for group supervision and individual supervision; provided peer
supervision
Child Assessment and Testing Practicum  
Noble H. Kelley Psychological Services Center 
August 2015-Present 
Supervisor: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. 
 Administered psychological test batteries for children and adolescents ages 5-17
 Assessed for concerns including ADHD, LDs, anxiety and mood disorders;
recommended accommodations to school staff and consulted with school
counselors to implement recommendations
 Completed achievement testing for Jefferson County Public School students
 Utilized assessment tools including: WISC-V, WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, CAARS,
CPT, WJ-III, MMPI
Pediatric Psychology Inpatient Consultation/Liaison Service 
Norton Children’s Hospital, Louisville, KY 
University of Louisville Department of Pediatrics, Louisville, KY 
July 2016-August 2017 
Supervisor: Bryan Carter, Ph.D. 
 Evaluated children with acute and chronic medical illnesses at the request of
attending physicians to assist with coping, adherence and communication between
children, families and hospital staff
 Implemented evidence-based interventions for children and their families
undergoing long-term hospitalizations to promote healthy development and
optimal functioning post-discharge
 Conducted psycho-social pre-transplant evaluation, participated in heart failure
team meetings and care conferences, and provided ongoing inpatient care for
children awaiting solid organ and bone marrow transplants
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 Completed risk assessments for suicidal patients with dispositions for psychiatric
care following medical stabilization
 Received weekly one-to-one supervision including live supervision
Pediatric Psychology Outpatient Clinic 
Bingham Child Guidance Clinic 
University of Louisville Department of Pediatrics, Louisville, KY 
July 2016—August 2017 
Supervisor: Bryan Carter, Ph.D. 
 Provided short-term after-care for medically ill children following hospital
discharge to promote recovery and facilitate continuity of care
 Implemented evidence-based therapy on an outpatient basis for children with
chronic medical conditions and chronic pain, psychosomatic disorders, and
related anxiety and mood symptoms
 Co-led the Children’s Health and Illness Recovery Program (CHIRP), a
manualized therapy for adolescents managing chronic illnesses and pain, and
related stress symptoms
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
2017-Present Society for Pediatric Psychology 
Graduate student member 
2015-Present Anxiety and Depression Association of America 
Graduate student member 
Child and Adolescent Anxiety SIG 
2015-2016 Vice Chair 
2014-Present American Psychological Association 
Graduate student member 
2014-Present Association of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies 
Graduate student member 
Child and Adolescent Anxiety SIG 
Oppression and Resilience Minority Health SIG-in-
formation 
AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS: 
2014-2016 Research Fellowship, College of Arts and Sciences, 
University of Louisville 
June 2017 Preliminary Qualifying Examination: Distinguished Pass 
May 2016 Excellence in Research Award—University of Louisville 
Department of Psychological  and Brain Sciences 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE: 
Graduate Teaching Assistant 
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 
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 Social Psychology, Lead Instructor: Lora Haynes, Ph.D.
August 2016-December 2016
 Abnormal Psychology, Lead Instructor: Tamara Newton, Ph.D.
January 2017-May 2017
 Social Psychology, Lead Instructor: Lora Haynes, Ph.D.
August 2017-Present
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE: 
Anxiety and Stress in Kids (ASK) Lab 
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 
Supervisor: Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D. 
July 2014—July 2016, Research fellow; July 2016—Present, Study coordinator 
 Produced and submitted an IRB application investigating the cognitive
development of children with anxiety and related disorders in middle childhood;
managed IRB correspondence and continuing reviews for multiple studies
 Administered the ADIS-IV-C/P and the ADIS-5-Client; wrote diagnostic
evaluations for children based on data obtained from structured interviews and
assessment measures; provided feedback and recommendations to parents
 Conducted data cleaning and analysis using SPSS, AMOS, PROCESS, R, and
REDCap; Collected physiological data including heartrate variability, respiration,
and eye movement
 Trained and supervised undergraduate research assistants and beginning graduate
students in assessment administration and data analysis
Child Anxiety Prevention Study (CAPS) 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, MD 
Supervisor: Golda Ginsburg, Ph.D. 
June 2010—December 2013, Research assistant 
 Administered questionnaires and behavioral tasks to families as part of a multi-
site R01 funded study investigating the prevention of anxiety disorders in at-risk
children
 Prepared and analyzed data using SPSS; coded behavioral tasks
 Reviewed literature and contributed to the writing and revision of grant
applications, manuscripts and poster abstracts
 Conducted follow-up phone screenings and brief clinical interviews with enrolled
families
GRANTS: 
2016-2017 GSC Travel Grant, University of Louisville ($350) 
2015-2016 GSC Research Grant, University of Louisville ($300) 
2015-2016 GSC Travel Grant, University of Louisville ($350) 
2014-2015 GSC Travel Grant, University of Louisville ($350) 
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